The Apostates
Quick exit

An expanded study

The Proof That Determinism Is Decreed in Islam

An Expanded Study in Establishing the Doctrine of Determinism (al-jabr): Its Scriptural and Rational Evidence, the Refinement of Four Subtle Questions Raised by Later Theologians, and a Detailed Response to the Muʿtazila, the Ashʿariyya and the Māturīdiyya

Contents

Introduction

The question of determinism and choice (al-jabr wa-l-ikhtiyār) is among the most intricate questions of dialectical theology (kalām) that have occupied the Community since the age of the Companions. The sects divided over it into parties: from those who say that the servant creates his own act independently, like the Muʿtazila; to those who say that the act belongs wholly to God and the servant has no share in it whatsoever, like the Jahmiyya; to a middle group that tried to reconcile the texts that affirm the comprehensiveness of God’s knowledge, power and creation with the demand of reason and revealed law that the servant be responsible and accountable.

What we propose in this study is that a complete induction of the texts of the Qurʾān and the hadith, and of the statements of the foremost Companions who received knowledge directly from Mohammed leads to only one conclusion: that everything that proceeds from the servant (speech, action, faith and unbelief) was written beforehand, known from eternity, and created by God alone; and that what is called “choice” is no more than a formal stage upon which the decrees run, decrees which the pen wrote fifty thousand years before the creation of the heavens and the earth. Put plainly: man is driven (musayyar) and compelled (majbūr) in every one of his acts. That is the thesis this study establishes.

The rational core of the study is a single definition and what follows from it. Choice is the power to preponderate between possibles (qudrat al-tarjīḥ bayna al-mumkināt); and an act is carried out in reality only when it has become necessary (wājib). We shall show that God’s prior knowledge and His creation of the will turn one of the two alternatives into an impossible (mustaḥīl) at the very moment of choosing and the other into a necessary one, so that nothing possible remains between which to choose.

We shall also show that the best-known attempts to escape this conclusion, the Ashʿarī theory of “acquisition” (kasb) and the Māturīdī “optional part” (al-juzʾ al-ikhtiyārī), amount, by the definitions and admissions of those schools’ own authorities, to nothing but determinism under another name. We then refine four subtle questions to which those who wish to escape the implications of the texts often resort: the claim that God’s knowledge is “disclosive, not efficacious”; the claim that “knowledge follows the known”; the claim that His knowledge of universals does not entail knowledge of particulars; and the distinction between the “cosmic” and “legislative” wills, together with the question of the will being an uncreated eternal attribute. To all this we add the chapter “Sharpening the Sight in Establishing the Path of Determinism,” which casts the argument as an exhaustive division proceeding from the reality of will itself, and a philosophical chapter drawing on Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, and, to a limited extent, Ibn Rushd.

We conclude with a detailed rational critique of the doctrines of the Muʿtazila, Ashʿariyya and Māturīdiyya, and an appendix in which (in the interest of scholarly trust) we set out the strongest arguments of the opponents against the arguments of this very study, each in its own box and each labelled with the fallacy it commits, so that the reader may see both sides of the dispute in full, and then judge whether these replies, however skilfully polished, can stand against the sum of the scriptural and rational evidence presented.

The Argument in Brief

The whole argument of this study, step by step, with the place where each step is established.

  1. The definition. Choice is the power to preponderate between possibles, and an act occurs only once it has become necessary. Where one side cannot occur, there is nothing to choose between. (Part Two, Ch. 1)
  1. The texts. The Qurʾān and the authentic hadith state that God wrote everything before creating it, that guidance and misguidance are by His will, and that the people of the Garden and of the Fire were assigned before they acted. (Part One)
  1. Foreknowledge. God knew from eternity which side would occur. The other side would make His knowledge ignorance, so it is impossible, and the known side is necessary. In time-bound form: the Qurʾān announced in Abū Lahab’s lifetime that he would die an unbeliever, so his belief was impossible while he was commanded to believe. (Part Two, Ch. 1)
  1. The created will and preponderance. The will is originated and needs a preponderator; the chain of preponderators ends in one not from the servant; once it is present the act is necessary, before it impossible. (Part Two, Ch. 1)
  1. Further proofs from the theologians’ books. The servant does not know the details of his own precise acts, so he is not their originator; two independent powers over one act would make him a second creator; every act runs through a chain whose first link the servant did not choose, so “man is compelled in his very choosing” (al-Rāzī); no belief is chosen, so faith and unbelief are compelled; and the Ashʿarīs’ own textbook opens its ethics with “the servant is compelled in his acts” (al-Ījī). (Part Two, Ch. 4)
  1. The escapes fail. The Muʿtazilī independent power, the Ashʿarī acquisition, the Māturīdī optional part and the Atharī “real cause” each grant the premises. Their own imams grant the premises, and several state the conclusion in their own words: al-Rāzī and al-Juwaynī grant necessitation; al-Ghazālī (“compelled to choose”), al-Taftāzānī (“compelled in the guise of one who chooses”) and Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī state it; Ibn Taymiyya grants it while keeping the name “real doer”. (Part Two, Ch. 2)
  1. The subtle questions. “Knowledge is disclosive,” “knowledge follows the known,” “God knows only universals,” and “the cosmic will is not the legislative will” do not touch the conclusion; and the exhaustive division of “Sharpening the Sight” closes every remaining path. (Part Three)
  1. Justice. Faced with punishment for what was decreed, the schools give no rational answer: they answer that God owns His creatures and “is not asked about what He does.” (Part Two, Ch. 3)
  1. Conclusion. By the Sunnī sources themselves, every act of every creature was, at the moment it occurred, the only one that could occur: man is driven and compelled in all his acts. (Conclusion)

Part One: The Scriptural Evidence

Chapter One: Verses of the Noble Qurʾān

First: Verses on the creation of acts and the denial of independent will to the servant

al-Ṣāffāt 37:96

﴿وَاللَّهُ خَلَقَكُمْ وَمَا تَعْمَلُونَ﴾

“And Allah created you and what you do.”

This verse was revealed in the context of refuting the argument of Abraham’s people for worshipping the idols they had carved with their own hands. God made their work (the carving itself) subject to His creation, glorified is He, and the word “act” here is a general noun that includes every deed that issues from the servant. If God is the creator of the servant’s act, what meaning remains for the servant being a “true agent” apart from God’s creation?

al-Takwīr 81:29

﴿وَمَا تَشَاءُونَ إِلَّا أَن يَشَاءَ اللَّهُ رَبُّ الْعَالَمِينَ﴾

“And you do not will except that Allah wills, Lord of the worlds.”

al-Insān 76:30

﴿وَمَا تَشَاءُونَ إِلَّا أَن يَشَاءَ اللَّهُ ۚ إِنَّ اللَّهَ كَانَ عَلِيمًا حَكِيمًا﴾

“And you do not will except that Allah wills. Indeed, Allah is ever Knowing and Wise.”

The Qurʾān repeats this meaning in two different sūras: the servant’s will (which is the root of the will on which action is built according to all the sects) is suspended on God’s will and conditional upon it, not the reverse. Were the servant’s will independent, it would not need God’s will as a condition of its occurrence.

al-Anfāl 8:17

﴿فَلَمْ تَقْتُلُوهُمْ وَلَٰكِنَّ اللَّهَ قَتَلَهُمْ ۚ وَمَا رَمَيْتَ إِذْ رَمَيْتَ وَلَٰكِنَّ اللَّهَ رَمَىٰ﴾

“You did not kill them, but it was Allah who killed them; and you did not throw when you threw, but it was Allah who threw.”

This is among the clearest verses of the Qurʾān in denying true agency to the servant even in his most particular, direct, sensory acts: Mohammed’s throwing of pebbles on the day of Badr. God denied the throw to Mohammed himself in the very same sentence that affirmed to him the form of throwing (“when you threw”): He affirmed the outward form and denied the reality of the act, which is precisely what determinism means: a movement whose appearance is from the servant and whose reality is from God.

al-Baqara 2:253

﴿وَلَوْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ مَا اقْتَتَلُوا وَلَٰكِنَّ اللَّهَ يَفْعَلُ مَا يُرِيدُ﴾

“And had Allah willed, they would not have fought each other; but Allah does what He intends.”

The verse ties the occurrence of the very fighting that the combatants chose to God’s will, so that its non-occurrence would have followed from His will alone, with no mention of any effect of their choice in that. It closes with “Allah does what He intends,” making the fighting His doing, though it was carried out by their hands.

al-Aʿrāf 7:179

﴿وَلَقَدْ ذَرَأْنَا لِجَهَنَّمَ كَثِيرًا مِّنَ الْجِنِّ وَالْإِنسِ ۖ لَهُمْ قُلُوبٌ لَّا يَفْقَهُونَ بِهَا وَلَهُمْ أَعْيُنٌ لَّا يُبْصِرُونَ بِهَا وَلَهُمْ آذَانٌ لَّا يَسْمَعُونَ بِهَا﴾

“And We have certainly created for Hell many of the jinn and mankind. They have hearts with which they do not understand, they have eyes with which they do not see, and they have ears with which they do not hear.”

The expression “We have created for Hell” admits only the meaning of creation for the sake of an end: that is, He created them with Hell as their destination. This is a text that the fate of a group of creatures was decreed before their creation, not the result of a free choice they exercise later.

Hūd 11:118–119

﴿وَلَوْ شَاءَ رَبُّكَ لَجَعَلَ النَّاسَ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً ۖ وَلَا يَزَالُونَ مُخْتَلِفِينَ ۝ إِلَّا مَن رَّحِمَ رَبُّكَ ۚ وَلِذَٰلِكَ خَلَقَهُمْ ۗ وَتَمَّتْ كَلِمَةُ رَبِّكَ لَأَمْلَأَنَّ جَهَنَّمَ مِنَ الْجِنَّةِ وَالنَّاسِ أَجْمَعِينَ﴾

“And if your Lord had willed, He could have made mankind one community; but they will not cease to differ, except those upon whom your Lord has bestowed mercy, and for that He created them. And the word of your Lord has been fulfilled: ‘I will surely fill Hell with jinn and men all together.’ ”

“And for that He created them” (that is, for difference, or in accordance with the mercy and wretchedness just mentioned) is another text that ties the purpose of creation to two opposed destinies (mercy and punishment), both prior to the existence of the persons themselves; it then closes with an emphatic divine oath (“I will surely fill”) that Hell will be filled, a report that does not fail.

Second: Verses of sealing, imprinting and direct misguidance

al-Baqara 2:7

﴿خَتَمَ اللَّهُ عَلَىٰ قُلُوبِهِمْ وَعَلَىٰ سَمْعِهِمْ ۖ وَعَلَىٰ أَبْصَارِهِمْ غِشَاوَةٌ ۖ وَلَهُمْ عَذَابٌ عَظِيمٌ﴾

“Allah has set a seal upon their hearts and upon their hearing, and over their vision is a veil, and for them is a great punishment.”

God opened Sūrat al-Baqara by mentioning the categories of people. When He reached the unbelievers, He did not merely say, “They chose unbelief and so deserved punishment”; rather, He ascribed the sealing of their hearts, hearing and sight to Himself from the outset, a sealing that objectively prevents faith thereafter.

al-Anʿām 6:110

﴿وَنُقَلِّبُ أَفْئِدَتَهُمْ وَأَبْصَارَهُمْ كَمَا لَمْ يُؤْمِنُوا بِهِ أَوَّلَ مَرَّةٍ وَنَذَرُهُمْ فِي طُغْيَانِهِمْ يَعْمَهُونَ﴾

“And We turn their hearts and their eyes away, just as they did not believe in it the first time, and We leave them in their transgression, wandering blindly.”

Yūnus 10:96–97

﴿إِنَّ الَّذِينَ حَقَّتْ عَلَيْهِمْ كَلِمَتُ رَبِّكَ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ ۝ وَلَوْ جَاءَتْهُمْ كُلُّ آيَةٍ حَتَّىٰ يَرَوُا الْعَذَابَ الْأَلِيمَ﴾

“Indeed, those upon whom the word of your Lord has come due will not believe, even if every sign should come to them, until they see the painful punishment.”

This verse is explicit in negating the effect of any proof or miracle on one “upon whom the word of your Lord has come due” (that is, in whom the decree of wretchedness has preceded) even if every sign came to him. Their lack of faith is therefore not merely the result of their bad choice, but of a prior word that came due against them, such that no proof can budge it.

Fāṭir 35:8

﴿أَفَمَن زُيِّنَ لَهُ سُوءُ عَمَلِهِ فَرَآهُ حَسَنًا ۖ فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ يُضِلُّ مَن يَشَاءُ وَيَهْدِي مَن يَشَاءُ﴾

“Then is one to whom the evil of his deed has been made attractive so that he sees it as good [like one guided]? For indeed, Allah leaves astray whom He wills and guides whom He wills.”

al-Zumar 39:36 (end), 37 (beginning)

﴿وَمَن يُضْلِلِ اللَّهُ فَمَا لَهُ مِنْ هَادٍ ۝ وَمَن يَهْدِ اللَّهُ فَمَا لَهُ مِن مُّضِلٍّ﴾

“And whomever Allah leaves astray, for him there is no guide. And whomever Allah guides, for him there is no misleader.”

al-Naḥl 16:93

﴿وَلَوْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ لَجَعَلَكُمْ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً وَلَٰكِن يُضِلُّ مَن يَشَاءُ وَيَهْدِي مَن يَشَاءُ ۚ وَلَتُسْأَلُنَّ عَمَّا كُنتُمْ تَعْمَلُونَ﴾

“And if Allah had willed, He could have made you one community; but He leaves astray whom He wills and guides whom He wills; and you will surely be questioned about what you used to do.”

Note the order in the verse of al-Naḥl: He first affirmed His absolute will in guidance and misguidance, then followed with the question about deeds. The precedence of misguidance and guidance did not prevent the attachment of responsibility and questioning, which is exactly what will be elaborated later in the discussion “Accountability Together with Determinism.”

al-Anʿām 6:39

﴿مَن يَشَإِ اللَّهُ يُضْلِلْهُ وَمَن يَشَأْ يَجْعَلْهُ عَلَىٰ صِرَاطٍ مُّسْتَقِيمٍ﴾

“Whomever Allah wills, He leaves him astray; and whomever He wills, He places him on a straight path.”

This verse is among the clearest in the chapter: the act of misguidance and guidance is suspended on God’s will alone (“whomever Allah wills,” “whomever He wills”), without any mention of a reason returning to the servant’s prior choice as a condition of that will, contrary to the qualifications some later authors try to insert, for which the wording of the verse offers no indication.

al-Kahf 18:17

﴿وَتَرَى الشَّمْسَ إِذَا طَلَعَت تَّزَاوَرُ عَن كَهْفِهِمْ ذَاتَ الْيَمِينِ وَإِذَا غَرَبَت تَّقْرِضُهُمْ ذَاتَ الشِّمَالِ وَهُمْ فِي فَجْوَةٍ مِّنْهُ ۚ ذَٰلِكَ مِنْ آيَاتِ اللَّهِ ۗ مَن يَهْدِ اللَّهُ فَهُوَ الْمُهْتَدِ ۖ وَمَن يُضْلِلْ فَلَن تَجِدَ لَهُ وَلِيًّا مُّرْشِدًا﴾

“… That is among the signs of Allah. Whoever Allah guides is the rightly guided, and whoever He leads astray, you will never find for him a guiding protector.”

al-Muddaththir 74:31

﴿كَذَٰلِكَ يُضِلُّ اللَّهُ مَن يَشَاءُ وَيَهْدِي مَن يَشَاءُ ۚ وَمَا يَعْلَمُ جُنُودَ رَبِّكَ إِلَّا هُوَ﴾

“Thus Allah leaves astray whom He wills and guides whom He wills. And none knows the soldiers of your Lord except Him.”

al-Muddaththir 74:56

﴿وَمَا يَذْكُرُونَ إِلَّا أَن يَشَاءَ اللَّهُ ۚ هُوَ أَهْلُ التَّقْوَىٰ وَأَهْلُ الْمَغْفِرَةِ﴾

“And they will not remember except that Allah wills. He is worthy of fear and worthy of forgiveness.”

al-Anʿām 6:112

﴿وَكَذَٰلِكَ جَعَلْنَا لِكُلِّ نَبِيٍّ عَدُوًّا شَيَاطِينَ الْإِنسِ وَالْجِنِّ يُوحِي بَعْضُهُمْ إِلَىٰ بَعْضٍ زُخْرُفَ الْقَوْلِ غُرُورًا ۚ وَلَوْ شَاءَ رَبُّكَ مَا فَعَلُوهُ ۖ فَذَرْهُمْ وَمَا يَفْتَرُونَ﴾

“And thus We have made for every prophet an enemy, devils from among mankind and jinn, inspiring to one another decorative speech in delusion. But if your Lord had willed, they would not have done it, so leave them and what they invent.”

Yūnus 10:100

﴿وَمَا كَانَ لِنَفْسٍ أَن تُؤْمِنَ إِلَّا بِإِذْنِ اللَّهِ ۚ وَيَجْعَلُ الرِّجْسَ عَلَى الَّذِينَ لَا يَعْقِلُونَ﴾

“And it is not for a soul to believe except by permission of Allah, and He will place defilement upon those who will not use reason.”

Each of these verses ties the act itself, not only its outcome, to God’s will: remembering, believing, the devils’ inspiration, guidance and misguidance. The last, “it is not for a soul to believe except by permission of Allah,” states the conclusion of Part Two in the Qurʾān’s words: belief is not possible for a soul unless God permits it.

al-Anʿām 6:125

﴿فَمَن يُرِدِ اللَّهُ أَن يَهْدِيَهُ يَشْرَحْ صَدْرَهُ لِلْإِسْلَامِ ۖ وَمَن يُرِدْ أَن يُضِلَّهُ يَجْعَلْ صَدْرَهُ ضَيِّقًا حَرَجًا كَأَنَّمَا يَصَّعَّدُ فِي السَّمَاءِ﴾

“So whomever Allah wants to guide, He expands his breast to Islam; and whomever He wants to leave astray, He makes his breast tight and constricted as though he were climbing into the sky.”

The breast is the seat of acceptance and refusal. The verse makes its expansion toward Islam, and its constriction against it, the effect of God’s will (yurid), and places that will before the servant’s acceptance or refusal, not after it. Ibn Taymiyya himself cites this verse as the example of the cosmic will (see Part Three, Chapter Three).

al-Sajda 32:13

﴿وَلَوْ شِئْنَا لَآتَيْنَا كُلَّ نَفْسٍ هُدَاهَا وَلَٰكِنْ حَقَّ الْقَوْلُ مِنِّي لَأَمْلَأَنَّ جَهَنَّمَ مِنَ الْجِنَّةِ وَالنَّاسِ أَجْمَعِينَ﴾

“And had We willed, We would have given every soul its guidance; but the word from Me has come due: I will surely fill Hell with jinn and men all together.”

Here guidance for every soul is placed within God’s power and will, and its being withheld is explained not by the servants’ choice but by a prior word (“the word from Me has come due”), the same “word” that Hūd and Yūnus speak of.

Ibrāhīm 14:4

﴿وَمَا أَرْسَلْنَا مِن رَّسُولٍ إِلَّا بِلِسَانِ قَوْمِهِ لِيُبَيِّنَ لَهُمْ ۖ فَيُضِلُّ اللَّهُ مَن يَشَاءُ وَيَهْدِي مَن يَشَاءُ ۚ وَهُوَ الْعَزِيزُ الْحَكِيمُ﴾

“And We did not send any messenger except in the language of his people to state clearly for them, and Allah leaves astray whom He wills and guides whom He wills; and He is the Exalted in Might, the Wise.”

This verse adds emphasis to what preceded: even when the messenger is sent in the language of his people to make the truth fully clear and remove excuse, the final outcome (misguidance or guidance) remains suspended on God’s absolute will, not on the servant’s mere response or independent refusal.

Third: Verses of prior writing and eternal decree

al-Qamar 54:49

﴿إِنَّا كُلَّ شَيْءٍ خَلَقْنَاهُ بِقَدَرٍ﴾

“Indeed, all things We created with predestination.”

al-Furqān 25:2

﴿وَخَلَقَ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ فَقَدَّرَهُ تَقْدِيرًا﴾

“…and created each thing and determined it with [precise] determination.”

al-Aḥzāb 33:38

﴿وَكَانَ أَمْرُ اللَّهِ قَدَرًا مَّقْدُورًا﴾

“And the command of Allah is ever a decree determined.”

al-Ḥijr 15:21

﴿وَإِن مِّن شَيْءٍ إِلَّا عِندَنَا خَزَائِنُهُ وَمَا نُنَزِّلُهُ إِلَّا بِقَدَرٍ مَّعْلُومٍ﴾

“And there is not a thing but that with Us are its depositories, and We do not send it down except in a known measure.”

al-Ḥadīd 57:22

﴿مَا أَصَابَ مِن مُّصِيبَةٍ فِي الْأَرْضِ وَلَا فِي أَنفُسِكُمْ إِلَّا فِي كِتَابٍ مِّن قَبْلِ أَن نَّبْرَأَهَا ۚ إِنَّ ذَٰلِكَ عَلَى اللَّهِ يَسِيرٌ﴾

“No disaster strikes upon the earth or among yourselves except that it is in a register before We bring it into being. Indeed that, for Allah, is easy.”

“Before We bring it into being” is a text without ambiguity: the writing precedes the creation of the event itself, not merely its occurrence in the external world after the servant chooses his act. This demolishes every attempt to portray God’s knowledge and writing as a mere later “recording” of a free act issuing from the servant.

al-Isrāʾ 17:13

﴿وَكُلَّ إِنسَانٍ أَلْزَمْنَاهُ طَائِرَهُ فِي عُنُقِهِ ۖ وَنُخْرِجُ لَهُ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ كِتَابًا يَلْقَاهُ مَنشُورًا﴾

“And [for] every person We have imposed his fate upon his neck, and We will bring forth for him on the Day of Resurrection a record which he will find spread open.”

“His fate” (ṭāʾirahu) means his lot and destiny, which is bound to his neck (a metaphor for imposition and necessity) with no mention of its being the result of free choice.

al-Aʿrāf 7:172

﴿وَإِذْ أَخَذَ رَبُّكَ مِن بَنِي آدَمَ مِن ظُهُورِهِمْ ذُرِّيَّتَهُمْ وَأَشْهَدَهُمْ عَلَىٰ أَنفُسِهِمْ أَلَسْتُ بِرَبِّكُمْ ۖ قَالُوا بَلَىٰ ۛ شَهِدْنَا﴾

“And [mention] when your Lord took from the children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them testify of themselves, [saying], ‘Am I not your Lord?’ They said, ‘Yes, we have testified.’ ”

In the section on hadith will come the explanation of this verse attributed to Mohammed: that God drew forth from Adam’s back two progenies, and said of one, “These are for Paradise,” and of the other, “These are for the Fire,” before they had been created at all, let alone done anything.

al-Tawba 9:51

﴿قُل لَّن يُصِيبَنَا إِلَّا مَا كَتَبَ اللَّهُ لَنَا هُوَ مَوْلَانَا ۚ وَعَلَى اللَّهِ فَلْيَتَوَكَّلِ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ﴾

“Say, ‘Never will we be struck except by what Allah has decreed for us; He is our protector.’ And upon Allah let the believers rely.”

God commanded Mohammed to reply to the hypocrites lying in wait that everything that befalls the believers (good or evil) is only “what Allah has decreed” for them, not an open possibility depending on their choice. The verse is general in form (“Never will we be struck except…”), so it includes by its generality everything that befalls a human being, including his own actions and choices, since these are part of what “befalls” him.

Chapter Two: The Authentic Hadiths

The hadiths are arranged by topic.

1. The Pen and the Tablet

al-Tirmidhī (2155), from ʿUbāda ibn al-Ṣāmit; al-Tirmidhī: “gharīb by this route”; graded ṣaḥīḥ by al-AlbānīSunnah.com

«إن أول ما خلق الله القلم، فقال: اكتب. فقال: ما أكتب؟ قال: اكتب القدر، ما كان وما هو كائن إلى الأبد».

“The first thing Allah created was the Pen. He said: ‘Write.’ It said: ‘What shall I write?’ He said: ‘Write the decree: what has been and what is to be, to eternity.’ ”

The wording “what is to be” (not “what might possibly be”) is the crux. The writing fell upon the very event that actually occurs, not upon a fan of its possibilities.

2. Fifty thousand years

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (2653), from the hadith of ʿAbdullāh ibn ʿAmrShamela

«إن الله كتب مقادير الخلائق قبل أن يخلق السماوات والأرض بخمسين ألف سنة، قال: وعرشه على الماء».

“Indeed, Allah wrote the measures of creation before He created the heavens and the earth by fifty thousand years, and His Throne was upon the water.”

3. Adam’s argument against Moses

Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (6614); Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (2652), both from Abū HurayraSunnah.com

«احتجّ آدم وموسى، فقال له موسى: يا آدم، أنت أبونا، خيّبتنا وأخرجتنا من الجنة. قال له آدم: يا موسى، اصطفاك الله بكلامه، وخطّ لك بيده، أتلومني على أمر قدّر الله عليّ قبل أن يخلقني بأربعين سنة؟ فحجّ آدمُ موسى، فحجّ آدمُ موسى» ثلاثًا.

“Adam and Moses disputed. Moses said to him: ‘O Adam, you are our father; you disappointed us and brought us out of Paradise.’ Adam said to him: ‘O Moses, Allah chose you with His speech and wrote for you with His hand; do you blame me for a matter that Allah decreed for me forty years before He created me?’ So Adam prevailed over Moses; so Adam prevailed over Moses”, three times.

This hadith by itself suffices to topple every later interpretation claiming that God’s knowledge and writing precede the act only in the sense of “following” a free choice: Adam argues that the sin was decreed for him before he himself was created, and Mohammed rules in his favour, he does not correct him by saying that the writing was merely a reflection of God’s knowledge of his free choice.

4. The hadith of Gabriel: faith in the decree is a pillar of faith

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (8); cf. Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (50) from Abū HurayraSunnah.com

عن عمر بن الخطاب رضي الله عنه، في الحديث الطويل المشهور بحديث جبريل، لما سأل جبريل عليه السلام النبيَّ صلى الله عليه وسلم عن الإيمان قال: «أن تؤمن بالله، وملائكته، وكتبه، ورسله، واليوم الآخر، وتؤمن بالقدر خيره وشره». قال: صدقت.

On the authority of ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, in the long, famous hadith of Gabriel: when Gabriel asked the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, about faith, he said: “That you believe in Allah, His angels, His books, His messengers and the Last Day, and that you believe in the decree, its good and its evil.” He said: “You have spoken truly.”

Mohammed made belief in the decree (its good and evil together, that is, including the evil of sins and unbelief) a sixth pillar of faith, not a marginal theological question on which disagreement is tolerable. Denying the precedence of the decree over the act is therefore not merely a weak opinion but a breach of a pillar of faith itself.

5. The heart of the son of Adam between two fingers

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (2654)Shamela

«إن قلوب بني آدم كلها بين إصبعين من أصابع الرحمن، كقلب واحد، يصرّفه حيث يشاء».

“Indeed, the hearts of the children of Adam are all between two of the fingers of the Most Merciful, as one heart; He turns it wherever He wills.”

The heart (the seat of will, intention and belief according to all sects without exception) is described here as lying between two fingers: that is, under a direct disposal in which its owner has no say, and it is the very source of the will on which choice-based action is built.

Jāmiʿ al-Tirmidhī (2140), from Anas; al-Tirmidhī: “ḥasan”Hadith Unlocked

كان رسول الله ﷺ يكثر أن يقول: «يا مقلب القلوب ثبت قلبي على دينك». فقلت: يا رسول الله، آمنا بك وبما جئت به، فهل تخاف علينا؟ قال: «نعم، إن القلوب بين أصبعين من أصابع الله يقلبها كيف يشاء».

The Messenger of Allah ﷺ used often to say: “O Turner of hearts, make my heart firm upon Your religion.” I said: “O Messenger of Allah, we believe in you and in what you brought; do you fear for us?” He said: “Yes. The hearts are between two of the fingers of Allah; He turns them as He wills.”

Even Mohammed asks God to keep his own heart firm, and fears for the hearts of the believers, because the heart is turned “as He wills.” Faith that a heart can lose at God’s turning is not held by the heart’s own power.

6. One who is sealed with the deeds of the people of the Fire after a long time

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (2651), from Abū HurayraShamela

«إن الرجل ليعمل الزمن الطويل بعمل أهل الجنة، ثم يختم عمله بعمل أهل النار. وإن الرجل ليعمل الزمن الطويل بعمل أهل النار، ثم يختم له عمله بعمل أهل الجنة».

“A man may do the deeds of the people of Paradise for a long time, then his deeds are sealed with the deeds of the people of the Fire; and a man may do the deeds of the people of the Fire for a long time, then his deeds are sealed for him with the deeds of the people of Paradise.”

The verb “is sealed” is in the passive: the worker is the one acted upon, not the actor; and this sealing comes after a long course of outward conduct that suggests its exact opposite, which shows that the outward course of a person does not necessarily reflect his final “free choice,” but that an external decision is imposed upon him at the decisive moment.

NoteThe “ninety years” wording is in Ibn Abī ʿĀṣim’s al-Sunna (no. 217), graded ṣaḥīḥ by al-Albānī; the text above is the version in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, which carries the same meaning (“a long time”).

7. The two handfuls

Sunan Abī Dāwūd (4703); al-Albānī: ṣaḥīḥ except for the wiping of the backSunnah.com

«إن الله عز وجل خلق آدم، ثم مسح ظهره بيمينه، فاستخرج منه ذرية، فقال: خلقت هؤلاء للجنة وبعمل أهل الجنة يعملون. ثم مسح ظهره فاستخرج منه ذرية، فقال: خلقت هؤلاء للنار وبعمل أهل النار يعملون».

“Indeed, Allah, mighty and exalted, created Adam, then wiped his back with His right hand and brought forth from it a progeny, and said: ‘I created these for Paradise, and they will act with the deeds of the people of Paradise.’ Then He wiped his back and brought forth from it a progeny, and said: ‘I created these for the Fire, and they will act with the deeds of the people of the Fire.’ ”

“I created these for Paradise, and they will act with the deeds of the people of Paradise” is a sentence reporting a future act of people who did not yet exist as willing, choosing persons, and it describes them directly after creation (not after testing their will) as “for Paradise” or “for the Fire.” The same division, without the wiping of the back, is in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (no. 18 below).

8. The drop in the womb

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (2645), from Ḥudhayfa ibn AsīdShamela

عن حذيفة بن أسيد الغفاري قال: سمعت رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم بأذني هاتين يقول: «إن النطفة تقع في الرحم أربعين ليلة، ثم يتصوّر عليها الملك، قال زهير: حسبته قال: الذي يخلقها، فيقول: يا رب، أذكر أم أنثى؟ فيجعله الله ذكرًا أو أنثى. ثم يقول: يا رب، أسويّ أو غير سويّ؟ فيجعله الله سويًا أو غير سويّ. ثم يقول: يا رب، ما رزقه؟ ما أجله؟ ما خلقه؟ ثم يجعله الله شقيًا أو سعيدًا».

Ḥudhayfa ibn Asīd al-Ghifārī said: I heard the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, with these two ears of mine, say: “The drop settles in the womb for forty nights; then the angel comes over it [Zuhayr: I think he said, the one who forms it] and says: ‘My Lord, male or female?’ and Allah makes it male or female. Then he says: ‘My Lord, well-formed or not?’ and Allah makes it well-formed or not. Then he says: ‘My Lord, what is his provision? What is his term? What is his character?’ Then Allah makes him wretched or fortunate.”

Wretchedness or fortune (which is the outcome of belief and unbelief in the Hereafter) is assigned at the foetal stage, before the foetus has any active will, by the agreement of all Islamic sects without exception. The subject of “makes him” is Allah; the foetus is only acted upon.

9. The testimony of four of the greatest Companions

Sunan Abī Dāwūd (4699); graded ṣaḥīḥ by al-AlbānīSunnah.com

عن ابن الديلمي قال: أتيت أُبيّ بن كعب فقلت له: وقع في نفسي شيء من القدر، فحدّثني بشيء لعل الله أن يُذهبه من قلبي. فقال: «لو أن الله عذّب أهل سماواته وأهل أرضه عذّبهم وهو غير ظالم لهم، ولو رحمهم كانت رحمته خيرًا لهم من أعمالهم، ولو أنفقت مثل أُحُد ذهبًا في سبيل الله ما قبله الله منك حتى تؤمن بالقدر، وتعلم أن ما أصابك لم يكن ليخطئك، وأن ما أخطأك لم يكن ليصيبك، ولو متّ على غير هذا لدخلت النار». قال: ثم أتيت عبد الله بن مسعود فقال مثل ذلك، ثم أتيت حذيفة بن اليمان فقال مثل ذلك، ثم أتيت زيد بن ثابت فحدّثني عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم مثل ذلك.

Ibn al-Daylamī said: I came to Ubayy ibn Kaʿb and said to him: “Something about the decree has entered my soul; tell me something by which Allah may remove it from my heart.” He said: “If Allah were to punish the people of His heavens and the people of His earth, He would punish them without being unjust to them; and if He had mercy on them, His mercy would be better for them than their deeds. If you were to spend the like of Uḥud in gold in the path of Allah, Allah would not accept it from you until you believe in the decree, and know that what befell you could not have missed you, and what missed you could not have befallen you; and if you died holding other than this, you would enter the Fire.” He said: Then I came to ʿAbdullāh ibn Masʿūd and he said the like; then I came to Ḥudhayfa ibn al-Yamān and he said the like; then I came to Zayd ibn Thābit, and he told me the like from the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him.

This report is of great weight in our subject: four of the most eminent Companions were asked independently, without collusion, about the very same doubt that is raised today in philosophical formulations, and their answer was one: absolute submission that everything that befell the servant could not have missed him, and that doubt about this principle warrants entry into the Fire even were he to spend the greatest wealth. Ubayy even met in advance the objection from justice: were God to punish all His creatures, He would not be unjust to them. In this report Zayd ibn Thābit narrates it from Mohammed; Ubayy, Ibn Masʿūd and Ḥudhayfa state it as their own position.

10. ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb’s explanation of the verse of the covenant

Musnad Aḥmad; Sunan Abī Dāwūd (4703); al-Albānī: ṣaḥīḥ except for the wiping of the backSunnah.com

سُئل عمر بن الخطاب رضي الله عنه عن قوله تعالى: ﴿وَإِذْ أَخَذَ رَبُّكَ مِن بَنِي آدَمَ مِن ظُهُورِهِمْ ذُرِّيَّتَهُمْ﴾… فقال: سمعت رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم سُئل عنها فقال: «إن الله خلق آدم، ثم مسح على ظهره بيمينه فاستخرج منه ذرية، فقال: خلقت هؤلاء للجنة وبعمل أهل الجنة يعملون. ثم مسح ظهره فاستخرج منه ذرية، فقال: خلقت هؤلاء للنار وبعمل أهل النار يعملون».

ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb was asked about the saying of the Exalted, “And when your Lord took from the children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants…” He said: I heard the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, being asked about it, and he said: “Allah created Adam, then wiped his back with his right hand and brought forth from it a progeny, and said: ‘I created these for Paradise, and they will act with the deeds of the people of Paradise.’ Then He wiped his back and brought forth from it a progeny, and said: ‘I created these for the Fire, and they will act with the deeds of the people of the Fire.’ ”

11. The question of the two men from Muzayna

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (2650)Shamela

عن أبي الأسود الدؤلي قال: قال لي عمران بن الحصين: أرأيت ما يعمل الناس اليوم ويكدحون فيه، أشيء قُضي عليهم ومضى عليهم من قدر ما سبق؟ أو فيما يستقبلون به مما أتاهم به نبيهم وثبتت الحجة عليهم؟ فقلت: بل شيء قُضي عليهم ومضى عليهم. قال: فقال: أفلا يكون ظلمًا؟ قال: ففزعت من ذلك فزعًا شديدًا، وقلت: كل شيء خلق الله وملك يده، فلا يُسأل عما يفعل وهم يُسألون. فقال لي: يرحمك الله، إني لم أرد بما سألتك إلا لأحزر عقلك؛ إن رجلين من مزينة أتيا رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم فقالا: يا رسول الله، أرأيت ما يعمل الناس اليوم ويكدحون فيه، أشيء قُضي عليهم ومضى فيهم من قدر قد سبق، أو فيما يستقبلون به…؟ فقال: «لا، بل شيء قُضي عليهم ومضى فيهم، وتصديق ذلك في كتاب الله عز وجل: ﴿وَنَفْسٍ وَمَا سَوَّاهَا ۝ فَأَلْهَمَهَا فُجُورَهَا وَتَقْوَاهَا﴾».

Abū l-Aswad al-Duʾalī said: ʿImrān ibn al-Ḥuṣayn said to me: “Tell me about what people do today and strive in: is it something decreed for them and carried out upon them from a decree that preceded, or is it in what they face anew of what their Prophet brought them, the proof having been established against them?” I said: “Rather it is something decreed for them and carried out upon them.” He said: “Would that not then be injustice?” I was greatly alarmed at that, and said: “Everything is Allah’s creation and the property of His hand; He is not asked about what He does, but they will be asked.” He said to me: “May Allah have mercy on you, I only asked to test your understanding. Two men of Muzayna came to the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, and said: ‘O Messenger of Allah, tell us about what people do today and strive in: is it something decreed for them and carried out among them from a decree that preceded, or is it in what they face anew…?’ He said: ‘No; rather it is something decreed for them and carried out among them, and its confirmation is in the Book of Allah: “By the soul and Him who proportioned it, and inspired it with its wickedness and its righteousness.” ’ ”

The Companion ʿImrān raised the objection from injustice himself, and the Successor Abū l-Aswad answered it not by denying the prior decree but by God’s absolute ownership, the answer the Ashʿarīs would later systematise, and whose cost is examined in Part Two, Chapter Three. Neither of them thought of escaping the objection by denying that the deeds were decreed beforehand. Mohammed’s proof-text then ascribes to God the very inspiring of the soul’s wickedness and righteousness.

12. The pen has dried on what is to be

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (2648), from Jābir; the wording “everyone is eased toward that for which he was created” is in the next hadith, from ʿImrān ibn Ḥuṣayn (Muslim 2649)Shamela

عن جابر قال: جاء سراقة بن مالك بن جعشم قال: يا رسول الله، بيّن لنا ديننا كأنا خُلقنا الآن، فيمَ العمل اليوم؟ أفيما جفّت به الأقلام وجرت به المقادير، أم فيما نستقبل؟ قال: «لا، بل فيما جفّت به الأقلام وجرت به المقادير». قال: ففيمَ العمل؟ … فقال: «اعملوا فكلٌّ ميسّر».

Jābir said: Surāqa ibn Mālik ibn Juʿshum came and said: “O Messenger of Allah, explain our religion to us as if we had been created just now: in what is the deed today? Is it in that on which the pens have dried and by which the decrees have run, or in what we face anew?” He said: “No; rather in that on which the pens have dried and by which the decrees have run.” He said: “Then why the deed?” … He said: “Act, for everyone is eased.”

13. “Should we not remain on what is written for us and leave off deeds?”

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (2647), from ʿAlī; al-Bukhārī (4949) has the same report with “Should we not rely?” (afalā nattakil)Shamela

عن علي قال: كنا في جنازة في بقيع الغرقد، فأتانا رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم فقعد وقعدنا حوله، ومعه مخصرة، فنكّس فجعل ينكت بمخصرته، ثم قال: «ما منكم من أحد، ما من نفس منفوسة، إلا وقد كتب الله مكانها من الجنة والنار، وإلا وقد كُتبت شقية أو سعيدة». قال: فقال رجل: يا رسول الله، أفلا نمكث على كتابنا وندع العمل؟ فقال: «من كان من أهل السعادة فسيصير إلى عمل أهل السعادة، ومن كان من أهل الشقاوة فسيصير إلى عمل أهل الشقاوة». فقال: «اعملوا فكلٌّ ميسّر؛ أما أهل السعادة فييسّرون لعمل أهل السعادة، وأما أهل الشقاوة فييسّرون لعمل أهل الشقاوة». ثم قرأ: ﴿فَأَمَّا مَنْ أَعْطَىٰ وَاتَّقَىٰ ۝ وَصَدَّقَ بِالْحُسْنَىٰ ۝ فَسَنُيَسِّرُهُ لِلْيُسْرَىٰ ۝ وَأَمَّا مَن بَخِلَ وَاسْتَغْنَىٰ ۝ وَكَذَّبَ بِالْحُسْنَىٰ ۝ فَسَنُيَسِّرُهُ لِلْعُسْرَىٰ﴾.

ʿAlī said: We were at a funeral in Baqīʿ al-Gharqad. The Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, came to us and sat, and we sat around him. He had a stick with him; he lowered his head and began scratching the ground with it, then said: “There is none of you, there is no living soul, but that Allah has written its place in Paradise or the Fire, and it has been written wretched or fortunate.” A man said: “O Messenger of Allah, should we not then remain on what is written for us and leave off deeds?” He said: “Whoever is of the people of happiness will come to the deeds of the people of happiness, and whoever is of the people of wretchedness will come to the deeds of the people of wretchedness.” Then he said: “Act, for everyone is eased: the people of happiness are eased to the deeds of the people of happiness, and the people of wretchedness are eased to the deeds of the people of wretchedness.” Then he recited: “As for he who gives and fears Allah and believes in the best, We will ease him toward ease; but as for he who withholds and considers himself free of need and denies the best, We will ease him toward difficulty.”

Observe that the Companions themselves (the most understanding and God-fearing of the Community) understood from Mohammed’s report of the precedence of the writing that it voids the point of action (“Should we not remain on what is written for us and leave off deeds?”). Mohammed did not correct this understanding by denying the precedence of the writing; rather he affirmed it, and added that the deed itself follows the writing: whoever is of the people of happiness “will come to” their deeds.

14. The children of the polytheists

Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (1383), from Ibn ʿAbbās; Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (2660)Sunnah.com

سُئل رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم عن أولاد المشركين، فقال: «الله إذ خلقهم أعلم بما كانوا عاملين».

The Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, was asked about the children of the polytheists, and he said: “Allah, when He created them, knew best what they would have done.”

This hadith settles the problem of accountability for the future: God’s knowledge of what “they would have done” had they reached maturity is taken into account in the judgment concerning them even before they reach the age of accountability, an exact parallel to the story of the boy killed by al-Khiḍr, which follows.

15. “Say: Allah’s decree, and what He willed He did”

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (2664)Shamela

«المؤمن القوي خير وأحب إلى الله من المؤمن الضعيف، وفي كلٍّ خير، احرص على ما ينفعك واستعن بالله ولا تعجز، وإن أصابك شيء فلا تقل: لو أني فعلت كان كذا وكذا، ولكن قل: قدر الله وما شاء فعل، فإن (لو) تفتح عمل الشيطان».

“The strong believer is better and more beloved to Allah than the weak believer, and in each there is good. Be eager for what benefits you, seek help from Allah, and do not despair. If something befalls you, do not say, ‘If only I had done such and such, it would have been such and such’; rather say, ‘Allah’s decree, and what He willed He did,’ for ‘if only’ opens the door to the work of Satan.”

16. “Everything is by decree, even incapacity and astuteness”

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (2655)Shamela

قال طاوس: أدركت ناسًا من أصحاب رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم يقولون: كل شيء بقدر. وسمعت عبد الله بن عمر يقول: قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: «كل شيء بقدر، حتى العجز والكيس، أو الكيس والعجز».

Ṭāwūs said: I met people among the Companions of the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, who said: “Everything is by decree.” And I heard ʿAbdullāh ibn ʿUmar say: The Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, said: “Everything is by decree, even incapacity and astuteness, or astuteness and incapacity.”

Incapacity and astuteness (that is, resolve and acumen in managing affairs) are things one might suppose belong to pure volitional acquisition that a person can increase or reduce by his own effort; yet Mohammed reported that they (like all things) fall under the prior decree. How much more so what is below them, of the outward acts of the limbs?

17. “The writing overtakes him”

Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (6594), the opening hadith of the Book of the Decree; also al-Bukhārī (3208) and Muslim (2643)Sunnah.com

عن عبد الله [بن مسعود] قال: حدثنا رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم وهو الصادق المصدوق قال: «إن أحدكم يُجمع في بطن أمه أربعين يومًا، ثم علقة مثل ذلك، ثم يكون مضغة مثل ذلك، ثم يبعث الله ملكًا فيؤمر بأربع: برزقه، وأجله، وشقي أو سعيد. فوالله إن أحدكم، أو الرجل، يعمل بعمل أهل النار، حتى ما يكون بينه وبينها غير باع أو ذراع، فيسبق عليه الكتاب، فيعمل بعمل أهل الجنة فيدخلها، وإن الرجل ليعمل بعمل أهل الجنة، حتى ما يكون بينه وبينها غير ذراع أو ذراعين، فيسبق عليه الكتاب، فيعمل بعمل أهل النار فيدخلها».

ʿAbdullāh [ibn Masʿūd] said: The Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, and he is the truthful, the one affirmed as truthful, told us: “Each one of you is gathered in his mother’s belly for forty days, then [he becomes] a clinging clot for the like of that, then he becomes a lump of flesh for the like of that. Then Allah sends an angel, and he is commanded with four [things]: his provision, his term, and wretched or fortunate. By Allah, one of you, or the man, does the deeds of the people of the Fire until there is nothing between him and it but a fathom or a cubit; then the writing overtakes him, and he does the deeds of the people of Paradise and enters it. And the man does the deeds of the people of Paradise until there is nothing between him and it but a cubit or two cubits; then the writing overtakes him, and he does the deeds of the people of the Fire and enters it.”

This hadith opens al-Bukhārī’s Book of the Decree, and its weight lies in its closing clause. The man’s outward conduct has carried him to within a cubit of his destination, yet what settles his end is not that conduct but “the writing,” which “overtakes him” (fa-yasbiqu ʿalayhi al-kitāb): the writing is the grammatical subject that acts, and the man is the one acted upon. The order of the clauses is no less telling: the writing overtakes him first, and only then (fa-yaʿmalu) does he do the deeds of the other party, the deed follows the writing, not the writing the deed.

Nor can this writing be portrayed as a later record of a free choice: it is commanded while the person is still a lump of flesh, before he has any will at all; and in al-Bukhārī’s other route of the same hadith (3208) the first thing the angel is told to write is “his deed” (ʿamalahu) itself, not merely its outcome. It thus gathers what nos. 6 and 8 established, but through al-Bukhārī’s own chain, introduced by Mohammed’s oath (“By Allah”) and by Ibn Masʿūd’s description of him as “the truthful, the one affirmed as truthful.”

The force of this hadith against free will was felt by the founders of the Muʿtazila themselves. Al-Rāzī reports, from al-Khaṭīb’s Taʾrīkh Baghdād, what ʿAmr ibn ʿUbayd said of it:

al-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ghayb, on Q 2:6, vol. 2, pp. 290–291 (Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth)Shamela

وَحَكَى الْخَطِيبُ فِي تَارِيخِ بَغْدَادَ عَنْ عَمْرِو بْنِ عُبَيْدٍ أَنَّهُ قَالَ: لَوْ سَمِعْتُ الْأَعْمَشَ يَقُولُ هَذَا لَكَذَّبْتُهُ، وَلَوْ سَمِعْتُ زَيْدَ بْنَ وَهْبٍ يَقُولُ هَذَا مَا أَحْبَبْتُهُ، وَلَوْ سَمِعْتُ عَبْدَ اللَّهِ بْنَ مَسْعُودٍ يَقُولُ هَذَا مَا قَبِلْتُهُ، وَلَوْ سَمِعْتُ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ يَقُولُ هَذَا لَرَدَدْتُهُ، وَلَوْ سَمِعْتُ اللَّهَ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ يَقُولُ هَذَا لَقُلْتُ لَيْسَ عَلَى هَذَا أَخَذْتَ مِيثَاقَنَا.

Al-Khaṭīb related in Taʾrīkh Baghdād from ʿAmr ibn ʿUbayd that he said: “Had I heard al-Aʿmash say this, I would have called him a liar; had I heard Zayd ibn Wahb say it, I would not have liked it; had I heard ʿAbdullāh ibn Masʿūd say it, I would not have accepted it; had I heard the Messenger of Allah say it, I would have rejected it; and had I heard Allah, mighty and majestic, say it, I would have said: Not on this did You take our covenant.”

ʿAmr’s rejection does not stop at the transmitters: he would have rejected the report from Mohammed himself, and from God. What he rejected was the content, whoever said it, a confession that the plain sense of the hadith cannot be reconciled with the Muʿtazilī doctrine of free will.

18. “He created them for it while they were in their fathers’ loins”

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (2662)Shamela

عن عائشة أم المؤمنين قالت: دُعي رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم إلى جنازة صبي من الأنصار، فقلت: يا رسول الله، طوبى لهذا، عصفور من عصافير الجنة، لم يعمل السوء ولم يدركه. قال: «أوَغير ذلك يا عائشة؟ إن الله خلق للجنة أهلًا، خلقهم لها وهم في أصلاب آبائهم، وخلق للنار أهلًا، خلقهم لها وهم في أصلاب آبائهم».

ʿĀʾisha, Mother of the Believers, said: The Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, was called to the funeral of a boy of the Anṣār. I said: “O Messenger of Allah, blessed is he, a sparrow among the sparrows of Paradise; he did no evil and never reached [the age of] it.” He said: “Or otherwise, ʿĀʾisha? Allah created people for Paradise; He created them for it while they were in their fathers’ loins. And He created people for the Fire; He created them for it while they were in their fathers’ loins.”

ʿĀʾisha reasoned from the child’s innocence (“he did no evil”) to his salvation, exactly as a believer in free will would. Mohammed did not affirm her reasoning; he corrected it by moving the decision from the deed to creation itself: the destination was fixed “while they were in their fathers’ loins,” before any deed, will or birth.

19. “These are in the Garden and I do not care”

Musnad Aḥmad (17660); al-Arnaʾūṭ: “ṣaḥīḥ li-ghayrih”Hadith Unlocked

عن عبد الرحمن بن قتادة السلمي: «إن الله عز وجل خلق آدم، ثم أخذ الخلق من ظهره، وقال: هؤلاء في الجنة ولا أبالي، وهؤلاء في النار ولا أبالي». قال: فقال قائل: يا رسول الله، فعلى ماذا نعمل؟ قال: «على مواقع القدر».

From ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Qatāda al-Sulamī: “God created Adam, then took creation from his back and said: ‘These are in the Garden, and I do not care; and these are in the Fire, and I do not care.’” Someone said: “O Messenger of Allah, then on what basis do we act?” He said: “On the places where the decree falls.”

The division into the Garden and the Fire is made at the taking of Adam’s offspring, before any of them existed, let alone acted. And when the Companions asked the obvious question, “then on what basis do we act?”, the answer was not “on your free choice” but “on the places where the decree falls”: the acts themselves are where the decree lands.

Chapter Three: The Story of the Boy Killed by al-Khiḍr, the Clearest Practical Divine Application of Determinism to a Child

Among the strongest evidences that a person’s fate (indeed even the ruling on him in this world) may be based on what he will be, not on what he actually did, is the story of Moses and al-Khiḍr in Sūrat al-Kahf, and its detail in the authentic hadith.

al-Kahf 18:74

﴿فَانطَلَقَا حَتَّىٰ إِذَا لَقِيَا غُلَامًا فَقَتَلَهُ قَالَ أَقَتَلْتَ نَفْسًا زَكِيَّةً بِغَيْرِ نَفْسٍ لَّقَدْ جِئْتَ شَيْئًا نُّكْرًا﴾

“So they set out until, when they met a boy, he killed him. [Moses] said, ‘Have you killed a pure soul for other than [having killed] a soul? You have certainly done a deplorable thing.’ ”

How was he killed? It is established in the two Ṣaḥīḥs, from the hadith of Ibn ʿAbbās, that al-Khiḍr took the boy by the head and tore it off with his hand:

Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (122), Ibn ʿAbbās from Ubayy ibn Kaʿb, from Mohammed; Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (2380) has: «فأخذ الخضر برأسه، فاقتلعه بيده، فقتله» (“al-Khiḍr took hold of his head, tore it off with his hand, and killed him”)HadithProphet

«فانطلقا، فإذا غلام يلعب مع الغلمان، فأخذ الخضر برأسه من أعلاه فاقتلع رأسه بيده».

“So they set off, and there was a boy playing with the other boys. Al-Khiḍr took hold of his head from above and tore his head off with his hand.”

The opening of the same hadith answers the claim before it is made. Saʿīd ibn Jubayr told Ibn ʿAbbās what Nawf al-Bikālī was saying about Moses (Nawf, the commentators note, was the stepson of Kaʿb al-Aḥbār, the best-known source of Isrāʾīlī lore) and Ibn ʿAbbās answered by rejecting Nawf and citing Mohammed:

Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (122), the opening of the same hadithHadithProphet

قلت لابن عباس: إن نوفا البكالي يزعم أن موسى ليس بموسى بني إسرائيل، إنما هو موسى آخر؟ فقال: كذب عدو الله، حدثنا أبي بن كعب عن النبي…

I said to Ibn ʿAbbās: “Nawf al-Bikālī claims that Moses [of this story] is not the Moses of the Children of Israel, but another Moses.” He said: “The enemy of God has lied. Ubayy ibn Kaʿb told us, from the Prophet…”

So the report is the very opposite of an Isrāʾīlī tale: Ibn ʿAbbās brings it as Mohammed’s account against the account of Kaʿb’s household. And Ibn ʿAbbās himself, in al-Bukhārī, forbade the Muslims to ask the People of the Book at all:

Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (7363), Ibn ʿAbbās’s own wordsHadith Unlocked

كيف تسألون أهل الكتاب عن شيء، وكتابكم الذي أنزل على رسول الله ﷺ أحدث، تقرءونه محضا لم يشب، وقد حدثكم أن أهل الكتاب بدلوا كتاب الله وغيروه، وكتبوا بأيديهم الكتاب، وقالوا: هو من عند الله ليشتروا به ثمنا قليلا، ألا ينهاكم ما جاءكم من العلم عن مسألتهم؟ لا والله، ما رأينا منهم رجلا يسألكم عن الذي أنزل عليكم.

“How can you ask the People of the Book about anything, when your Book, which was sent down to the Messenger of Allah ﷺ, is the most recent? You recite it pure and unmixed, and it has told you that the People of the Book altered the Book of Allah and changed it, wrote the book with their own hands and said, ‘It is from Allah,’ to sell it for a small price. Does the knowledge that has come to you not forbid you from asking them? No, by Allah, we have never seen a man of them ask you about what was sent down to you.”

Ibn ʿAbbās’s objection is not only to the people but to their books: “they altered the Book of Allah and changed it, and wrote the book with their own hands.” So even if he allowed himself to hear from Jews and Christians who had become Muslims, the material they carried came from books he had already declared corrupt. He could accept such material only where he had independent reason to think it true, and his method was to check, not to accept. His pupil Ṭāwūs reports him saying:

Ṭāwūs from Ibn ʿAbbās, in Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya, vol. 8 (biography of Ibn ʿAbbās)Wikisource

إن كنت لأسأل عن الأمر الواحد من ثلاثين من أصحاب رسول الله ﷺ.

“I used to ask about a single matter thirty of the Companions of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ.”

And in the same place Maʿmar names the main sources of his learning, one of whom is the very narrator of this hadith: “Most of Ibn ʿAbbās’s knowledge is from three: from ʿUmar, ʿAlī and Ubayy ibn Kaʿb.” So the only way Ibn ʿAbbās could take anything from the Isrāʾīliyyāt was if he already had reason to believe that this part of them was true, or if he examined a report after receiving it and found it true. Ibn ʿAbbās was the best judge of whether something he received had its origin in the Isrāʾīliyyāt. Since he detested taking from these corrupted books, he would never place such material in his explanation of the Qurʾān, for which he was praised by all. The claim that his exegesis could come from the Isrāʾīliyyāt therefore has no ground. This hadith is also the reason Ibn ʿUthaymīn cast doubt on the idea that Ibn ʿAbbās took from the Isrāʾīliyyāt.

And in this hadith the question does not even arise: Ibn ʿAbbās names his source, Ubayy from Mohammed, and brings it against Kaʿb’s stepson, whom he calls “the enemy of God.”

The report reaches Mohammed through two Ṣaḥīḥs (al-Bukhārī 122; Muslim 2380), and the killing itself is stated in the Qurʾān (18:74). Whoever sets this detail aside as Isrāʾīlī must set aside a hadith traced to Mohammed himself and agreed upon by al-Bukhārī and Muslim.

A child playing among children, who has committed no sin, has his head torn off by hand. Al-Khiḍr does not claim the act as his own: “And I did not do it of my own accord” (al-Kahf 18:82). The killing is God’s command, and the ruling rests on what the boy was made to be, not on anything he had done.

Moses denounced al-Khiḍr’s killing of the boy in the strongest terms and described him as a “pure soul,” that is, one who had not yet sinned and had not reached puberty. The divine answer came (on the tongue of al-Khiḍr) at the end of the story:

al-Kahf 18:80–81

﴿وَأَمَّا الْغُلَامُ فَكَانَ أَبَوَاهُ مُؤْمِنَيْنِ فَخَشِينَا أَن يُرْهِقَهُمَا طُغْيَانًا وَكُفْرًا ۝ فَأَرَدْنَا أَن يُبْدِلَهُمَا رَبُّهُمَا خَيْرًا مِّنْهُ زَكَاةً وَأَقْرَبَ رُحْمًا﴾

“And as for the boy, his parents were believers, and we feared that he would overburden them by transgression and disbelief. So we intended that their Lord should substitute for them one better than him in purity and nearer to mercy.”

The authentic hadith makes the matter clearer still and leaves no room for reinterpretation: in it Mohammed explained the reality of this boy in explicit words:

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (2661), from Ubayy ibn Kaʿb; Ibn Ḥibbān (6221) has “imprinted on the day he was imprinted as an unbeliever,” authenticated by Shuʿayb al-ArnaʾūṭShamela

«إن الغلام الذي قتله الخضر طُبع كافرًا، ولو عاش لأرهق أبويه طغيانًا وكفرًا».

“The boy whom al-Khiḍr killed was imprinted as an unbeliever; and had he lived, he would have burdened his parents with transgression and disbelief.”

“Imprinted as an unbeliever” admits, in the view of the people of language and exegesis, only the meaning: decreed, written and created in that state. This child (who had not reached puberty) was killed by a direct divine command, not for what he had actually done, but for what he “would be” had he been left alive, which is the very unbelief imprinted on him.

This demolishes completely any attempt to portray “God’s knowledge” as mere acquaintance with open possibilities that are settled later by free choice: this boy was not given time for his choice to be “settled”; rather, the ruling built on what he had been imprinted with was executed upon him, by the command of God Himself. If God knows with certainty and builds upon it a real ruling in this world decades before the act would occur, then all the more must His knowledge of what will be of every creature be a decisive knowledge that does not fail, a prior decree, not an open possibility.

Qatāda said of this story: “His parents were glad of him when he was born and grieved over him when he was killed; had he lived, it would have been their ruin. So let a man be content with the decree of Allah, for Allah’s decree for the believer in what he dislikes is better for him than His decree in what he loves” (transmitted by Ibn Kathīr in his exegesis at al-Kahf 18:80). This is an explicit acknowledgement from one of the great exegetes among the Successors that the incident was a decisive decree, not merely knowledge of a probable outcome.

Chapter Four: Summary of the Scriptural Evidence

If we gather together (1) the verses on the creation of acts and the denial of independence from the divine will; (2) the verses of sealing, imprinting and direct misguidance; (3) the verses of the writing preceding the creation of events themselves, not merely their occurrence; (4) the report of the four Companions, scribes of revelation, who gave the same answer; (5) the hadith of Gabriel, which makes belief in the decree a pillar of faith; (6) the hadith “Everything is by decree, even incapacity and astuteness,” which brings even acumen and resolve under the prior decree; (7) the hadith “the writing overtakes him” and the hadith of the Anṣārī child, which move the decisive factor from the deed to the writing and to creation itself; and (8) the story of the boy, which shows a direct divine practical application of a ruling based on “what will be,” not “what was”, then we face an integrated textual body that cannot be reconciled with any reading that makes the human will an independent, or even partial, source for producing the future, apart from an effective prior decree.

Part Two: The Rational Evidence

Chapter One: The Proof from Foreknowledge and the Created Will

The rational proof does not begin from a doctrine peculiar to us, but from a definition of choice that the free-will parties themselves need, and from premises on which all the Muslim sects agree. We first fix the terms, then state the premises, then set out the proof in two strands (foreknowledge and the creation of the will) and show where they meet.

First: The terms

  • Choice (free will) is the power to preponderate between possibles (qudrat al-tarjīḥ bayna al-mumkināt): a faculty by which the agent brings one of two alternatives, each of which can occur, out of equality into preponderance. Its object is therefore a pair of possibles at the moment of choosing. Where one side cannot occur, there is nothing to preponderate between, and the word “choice” has no referent.
  • The necessary (wājib) is that whose non-occurrence is impossible; the impossible (mustaḥīl, mumtaniʿ) is that whose occurrence is impossible; the possible (mumkin) is that whose occurrence and non-occurrence are both admissible.
  • Each of these is either in itself (li-dhātihi), by the thing’s own essence, or by another (li-ghayrihi), by a cause outside the essence. Every act of a creature is possible in itself; the question is what it is by another at the moment it is chosen.
  • An act is carried out in reality only when it has become necessary. As long as both sides remain equally admissible, neither occurs; one occurs only when its cause is complete, and at that point it is necessary by that cause. This is the principle the philosophers and later theologians state as “the possible, so long as it has not become necessary, does not exist,” and al-Rāzī states it in the passage quoted below.

Second: The premises

  1. God’s knowledge is eternal, encompasses every particular, and cannot fail to match what occurs; were it to fail, it would be ignorance, and ignorance is impossible for God. (Q 6:59; 10:61, see Part Three, Chapter Two.)
  1. God is the creator of everything, including the servant’s will. “Allah is the Creator of all things” (Q 39:62); “And you do not will except that Allah wills” (Q 81:29).
  1. What entails the impossible is itself impossible. This is a rule of reason that every party uses, and al-Rāzī states it in this very discussion: “what leads to the impossible is impossible” (al-mufḍī ilā l-muḥāl muḥāl).

Third: The proof from foreknowledge

This is not a construction of ours. Al-Rāzī, the foremost Ashʿarī theologian of his age, set it out in his commentary on “Indeed, those who disbelieve (it is all the same for them whether you warn them or do not warn them) they will not believe” (Q 2:6), in more than one form:

al-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ghayb (Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth), on Q 2:6, vol. 2, p. 286Shamela

وَتَقْرِيرُهُ أَنَّهُ تَعَالَى أَخْبَرَ عَنْ شَخْصٍ مُعَيَّنٍ أَنَّهُ لَا يُؤْمِنُ قَطُّ، فَلَوْ صَدَرَ مِنْهُ الْإِيمَانُ لَزِمَ انْقِلَابُ خَبَرِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى الصِّدْقِ كَذِبًا … وَالْمُفْضِي إِلَى الْمُحَالِ مُحَالٌ، فَصُدُورُ الْإِيمَانِ مِنْهُ مُحَالٌ … وَقَدْ يُذْكَرُ هَذَا فِي صُورَةِ الْعِلْمِ، هُوَ أَنَّهُ تَعَالَى لَمَّا عَلِمَ مِنْهُ أَنَّهُ لَا يُؤْمِنُ فَكَانَ صُدُورُ الْإِيمَانِ مِنْهُ يَسْتَلْزِمُ انْقِلَابَ عِلْمِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى جَهْلًا، وَذَلِكَ مُحَالٌ وَمُسْتَلْزِمُ الْمُحَالِ مُحَالٌ … وَهُوَ أَنَّ وُجُودَ الْإِيمَانِ يَسْتَحِيلُ أَنْ يُوجَدَ مَعَ الْعِلْمِ بِعَدَمِ الْإِيمَانِ، لِأَنَّهُ إِنَّمَا يَكُونُ عِلْمًا لَوْ كَانَ مُطَابِقًا لِلْمَعْلُومِ … فَلَوْ وُجِدَ الْإِيمَانُ مَعَ الْعِلْمِ بِعَدَمِ الْإِيمَانِ لَزِمَ أَنْ يَجْتَمِعَ فِي الْإِيمَانِ كَوْنُهُ مَوْجُودًا وَمَعْدُومًا مَعًا وَهُوَ مُحَالٌ.

“Its explanation is that the Exalted reported of a specific person that he would never believe; so if faith were to issue from him, God’s true report would have to turn into a lie … and what leads to the impossible is impossible; so the issuing of faith from him is impossible … This is also stated in the form of knowledge: since the Exalted knew of him that he would not believe, the issuing of faith from him entails the turning of God’s knowledge into ignorance, which is impossible, and what entails the impossible is impossible … [And in a third form:] the existence of faith cannot exist together with the knowledge of the non-existence of faith, since knowledge is knowledge only if it matches its object … so if faith existed together with the knowledge of its non-existence, faith would have to be both existent and non-existent at once, which is impossible.”

He then passed this verdict on it, before reporting the Muʿtazilī replies:

al-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ghayb (Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth), on Q 2:6, vol. 2, p. 287Shamela

وَهَذَا هُوَ الْكَلَامُ الْهَادِمُ لِأُصُولِ الِاعْتِزَالِ. وَلَقَدْ كَانَ السَّلَفُ وَالْخَلَفُ مِنَ الْمُحَقِّقِينَ مُعَوِّلِينَ عَلَيْهِ فِي دَفْعِ أُصُولِ الْمُعْتَزِلَةِ وَهَدْمِ قَوَاعِدِهِمْ، وَلَقَدْ قَامُوا وَقَعَدُوا وَاحْتَالُوا عَلَى دَفْعِهِ فَمَا أَتَوْا بِشَيْءٍ مُقْنِعٍ.

“This is the argument that demolishes the foundations of the Muʿtazila. The verifiers among the predecessors and the later scholars relied on it in repelling the principles of the Muʿtazila and demolishing their rules; and they stood up and sat down and devised stratagems to repel it, but brought nothing convincing.”

Nor is it only al-Rāzī. Al-Shahrastānī, reporting the doctrine of Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī himself, gives the result of the proof in a few words:

al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa-l-niḥal, vol. 1, p. 96 (on al-Ashʿarī)Shamela

وكما أراد وعلم، أراد من العباد ما علم وأمر القلم حتى كتب في اللوح المحفوظ. فذلك حكمه وقضاؤه وقدره الذي لا يتغير ولا يتبدل. وخلاف المعلوم: مقدور الجنس، محال الوقوع.

“Just as He willed and knew, He willed from the servants what He knew, and commanded the Pen so that it wrote in the Preserved Tablet. That is His judgment, His decree and His determination, which does not change or alter. And the contrary of what is known is of a kind that power can attach to, but impossible to occur.”

“Impossible to occur” is exactly what the proof establishes for B. Al-Ashʿarī keeps the phrase “of a kind that power can attach to” (that is, B considered as a type of act is the sort of thing a power could reach) but concedes that, as the contrary of what God knows, it cannot occur. A power whose object “cannot occur” is not a power to preponderate between two possibles.

The same proof in a form bound to time: Abū Lahab

An opponent may try to escape the proof by saying that God’s knowledge is eternal and outside time, so it is not “prior” to Zayd’s act and does not bind it. The Qurʾān closes this door. In Sūrat al-Masad God did not only know that Abū Lahab would not believe; He announced it, in Mecca, years before Abū Lahab died, in a revelation recited in public while Abū Lahab was alive and still commanded to believe:

al-Masad 111:1–3

﴿تَبَّتْ يَدَا أَبِي لَهَبٍ وَتَبَّ ۝ مَا أَغْنَىٰ عَنْهُ مَالُهُ وَمَا كَسَبَ ۝ سَيَصْلَىٰ نَارًا ذَاتَ لَهَبٍ﴾

“May the hands of Abū Lahab perish, and he has perished. His wealth will not avail him, nor what he earned. He will burn in a Fire of flame.”

Al-Rāzī states the argument on this sūra as the proof of the Sunnīs, reports the Muʿtazilī reply, and rejects it:

al-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ghayb (Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth), on Q 111:1–3, vol. 32, p. 353Shamela

احتج أهل السنة على وقوع تكليف ما لا يطاق بأن الله تعالى كلف أبا لهب بالإيمان، ومن جملة الإيمان تصديق الله في كل ما أخبر عنه، ومما أخبر عنه أنه لا يؤمن وأنه من أهل النار، فقد صار مكلفا بأنه يؤمن بأنه لا يؤمن، وهذا تكليف بالجمع بين النقيضين وهو محال. وأجاب الكعبي وأبو الحسين البصري بأنه لو آمن أبو لهب لكان لهذا الخبر خبرا بأنه آمن، لا بأنه ما آمن … واعلم أن هذين الجوابين في غاية السقوط، أما الأول: فلأن هذه الآية دالة على أن خبر الله عن عدم إيمانه واقع، والخبر الصدق عن عدم إيمانه ينافيه وجود الإيمان منافاة ذاتية ممتنعة الزوال، فإذا كان كلفه أن يأتي بالإيمان مع وجود هذا الخبر فقد كلفه بالجمع بين المتنافيين.

“The Sunnīs argued that the command of what cannot be done has actually occurred, from the fact that God commanded Abū Lahab to believe; and part of belief is to affirm God in everything He reported; and among what He reported is that he will not believe and is among the people of the Fire. So he was commanded to believe that he will not believe, and this is a command to join two contradictories, which is impossible. Al-Kaʿbī and Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī answered that had Abū Lahab believed, this report would have been a report that he believed, not that he did not … Know that these two answers are utterly worthless. As for the first: this verse shows that God’s report that he would not believe has actually occurred; and a true report that he would not believe excludes the existence of his belief, with an essential exclusion that cannot be removed. So if He commanded him to bring about belief while this report exists, He commanded him to join two things that exclude each other.”

Fourth: The proof from the creation of the will

The second strand reaches the same result from the side of the agent. The will that preponderates A over B is itself an originated thing; it needs a preponderator; and every party except the Muʿtazila holds that this preponderator, the motive (al-dāʿī), is created by God. Al-Rāzī, explaining “Allah has set a seal upon their hearts” (Q 2:7), sets out the argument and its conclusion:

al-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ghayb (Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth), on Q 2:7, vol. 2, pp. 291–292Shamela

فَإِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ صَيْرُورَتُهَا مَصْدَرًا لِلْفِعْلِ بَدَلًا عَنِ التَّرْكِ يَتَوَقَّفُ عَلَى انْضِمَامٍ مُرَجَّحٍ إِلَيْهَا أَوْ لَا يَتَوَقَّفُ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَتَوَقَّفْ فَقَدْ وَقَعَ الْمُمْكِنُ لَا عَنْ مُرَجَّحٍ … وَأَمَّا إِنْ تَوَقَّفَ عَلَى الْمُرَجَّحِ فَذَلِكَ الْمُرَجَّحُ إِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ مِنْ فِعْلِ اللَّهِ أَوْ مِنْ فِعْلِ الْعَبْدِ أَوْ لَا مِنْ فِعْلِ اللَّهِ وَلَا مِنْ فِعْلِ الْعَبْدِ، لَا جَائِزَ أَنْ يَكُونَ مِنْ فِعْلِ الْعَبْدِ وَإِلَّا لَزِمَ التَّسَلْسُلُ … فَثَبَتَ أَنَّ عِنْدَ حُصُولِ مُرَجِّحِ الْوُجُودِ يَكُونُ الْأَثَرُ وَاجِبَ الْوُجُودِ عَنِ الْمَجْمُوعِ الْحَاصِلِ مِنَ الْقُدْرَةِ، وَمِنْ ذَلِكَ الْمُرَجِّحِ، وَإِذَا ثَبَتَ هَذَا كَانَ الْقَوْلُ بِالْجَبْرِ لَازِمًا: لِأَنَّ قَبْلَ حُصُولِ ذَلِكَ الْمُرَجِّحِ كَانَ صُدُورُ الْفِعْلِ مُمْتَنِعًا وَبَعْدَ حُصُولِهِ يَكُونُ وَاجِبًا.

“Either its becoming a source of the act rather than of the omission depends on a preponderator joined to it, or it does not; if it does not, then the possible has occurred without a preponderator … and if it depends on the preponderator, that preponderator is either God’s act, or the servant’s act, or the act of neither. It cannot be the servant’s act, otherwise an infinite regress follows … So it is established that when the preponderator of existence is present, the effect is necessary from the combination of the power and that preponderator; and once this is established, determinism follows necessarily: for before that preponderator is present the issuing of the act is impossible, and after it is present it is necessary.”

“Before that preponderator is present the act is impossible, and after it is present it is necessary”: there is no third moment in which the act is merely possible and waiting for the servant to decide. Al-Rāzī then draws the scriptural consequence: God’s creation of the motive that necessitates unbelief in the heart is the “seal” on the heart that the verse speaks of.

The same strand in a purely rational form

Al-Rāzī also states this strand without the premise that God creates the motive, so that it binds even someone who denies that premise. In al-Muḥaṣṣal it is the first of the rational proofs he gives for the Ashʿarī position, and he closes it with a verdict of his own:

al-Rāzī, al-Muḥaṣṣal, vol. 1, pp. 456–457 (on the effect of the servant’s power)Eshia

العبد حال الفعل إما أن يمكنه الترك أو لا يمكنه. فإن لم يمكنه الترك فقد بطل قول المعتزلة. وإن أمكنه، فإما أن لا يفتقر ترجيح الفعل على الترك إلى مرجح، وهو باطل، لأنه تجويز أحد طرفي الممكن على الآخر لا لمرجح، أو يفتقر. وذلك المرجح إن كان من فعله عاد التقسيم، ولا يتسلسل، بل ينتهي إلى مرجح لا محالة لا يكون من فعله. ثم عند حصول ذلك المرجح إن أمكن أن لا يحصل ذلك الفعل، فليفرض ذلك الفعل غير حاصل، فحينئذ يحصل الفعل تارة ولا يحصل أخرى، مع أن نسبة ذلك المرجح إلى الوقتين سواء، فاختصاص أحد الوقتين بالحصول والآخر بعدم الحصول يكون ترجيحا لأحد طرفي الممكن المتساويين على الآخر من غير مرجح، وهو محال. وإن امتنع أن لا يحصل فقد بطل قول المعتزلة بالكلية، لأنه متى حصل المرجح وجب الفعل، ومتى لم يحصل امتنع، فلم يكن العبد مستقلا بالاختيار. وهذا كلام قاطع.

“At the time of the act, the servant is either able to omit it or not. If he is not able to omit it, the Muʿtazilī position is refuted. If he is able, then either the preponderance of doing over omitting needs no preponderator, which is false, because it allows one side of the possible to prevail over the other for no preponderator, or it does need one. If that preponderator is of his own doing, the division returns; it does not regress without end, but ends without fail in a preponderator that is not of his doing. Then, once that preponderator is present, if the act could still fail to occur, let us suppose it does not occur: the act would then occur at one time and not at another, although the preponderator stands equally to both times, so that one time’s having the act and the other’s lacking it would be a preponderance of one of two equal sides of the possible without a preponderator, which is impossible. And if it cannot fail to occur, the Muʿtazilī position is refuted entirely, for whenever the preponderator is present the act is necessary, and whenever it is absent the act is impossible, so the servant is not independent in choosing. This is a decisive argument.”

Every step uses only the principle that a possible does not prevail without a preponderator, which every school accepts. The chain of preponderators ends outside the servant; once the last one is present the act is necessary, and before it the act is impossible. This is the definition of choice in this chapter applied to the agent: at no moment are two sides open to him.

Fifth: Where the two strands meet

The two strands are one argument seen from two sides. Foreknowledge fixes which side is impossible and which necessary; the creation of the will supplies how the necessary side comes about in the agent, through a will and motive that God creates in him, matching what He knew. The agent finds in himself a will toward A, and A occurs from that will; but at no moment was B a possible he could have preponderated instead.

Of the two, the proof from foreknowledge is the stronger, for three reasons. (1) It depends on nothing but the perfection of God’s knowledge, which every Muslim party affirms; it does not depend on any theory of causes or motives. (2) It holds even against the Muʿtazila, who deny that God creates the servant’s will but affirm His eternal knowledge of every particular. (3) The only way out of it is to deny that God knows particulars before they occur (which is what Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam did, “fleeing from those difficulties,” as al-Rāzī reports) and that is unbelief by the agreement of the Muslims (Part Three, Chapter Two).

al-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ghayb (Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth), on Q 2:6, vol. 2, p. 289Shamela

وَمِنْهَا أَنَّ هِشَامَ بْنَ الْحَكَمِ زَعَمَ أَنَّهُ سُبْحَانَهُ لَا يَعْلَمُ الْأَشْيَاءَ قَبْلَ وُقُوعِهَا وَجَوَّزَ الْبَدَاءَ عَلَى اللَّهِ تَعَالَى … وَإِنَّمَا قَالَ بِهَذَا الْمَذْهَبِ فِرَارًا مِنْ تِلْكَ الْإِشْكَالَاتِ الْمُتَقَدِّمَةِ.

“Among them: that Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam claimed that He, glorified is He, does not know things before they occur, and permitted badāʾ [a change of mind] for God … and he only held this doctrine in flight from those difficulties mentioned above.”

Sixth: The objections to the proof

The proof never denied that B is possible in itself; it says so in its second step. Possibility in itself is a property of the act’s essence considered apart from every cause, and in that sense a stone’s rising into the air is “possible”, yet no one calls the stone free to rise. Choice, by the definition the free-will parties need, is a preponderance between alternatives that can occur at the moment of choosing. The question is therefore not what B is in itself, but whether B can occur at that moment, given God’s knowledge, and the objection does not answer it. Nor is there any contradiction in a thing being possible in itself and impossible by another: that is exactly what “necessary by another” means, and the objectors themselves use it of every created thing. As for “the capacity was present”: a capacity that cannot be exercised toward B, because B cannot occur, is a capacity in name only, which is what al-Ashʿarī conceded when he called the contrary of the known “impossible to occur.”

The objection is right that the conditional alone does not make the act necessary. But the proof has a second premise, which the objection drops: God’s knowledge that A is not something Zayd can still affect. Al-Rāzī states it against al-Kaʿbī: “the knowledge of one of these two was present, and it is present now as well” (Part Three, Chapter One). Put the two premises together:

To escape, the objector must deny premise 2: he must say that Zayd, by doing B, could make it that God had eternally known B instead of A. That is a power over God’s eternal attribute, a power to determine what God knew from eternity. No Muslim school grants a creature that power, and al-Rāzī answers it in the Abū Lahab passage: the report “has actually occurred,” and to suppose a different report is to give Abū Lahab power over a verse already revealed.

We accept it. The proof applies to every agent whose acts are known in advance, and God is no exception. What God knew from eternity that He would do, He must do, for the opposite would make His knowledge ignorance. So by the definition of choice set out at the start of this chapter, God too does not choose between possibles: He is compelled (majbūr) by His own eternal knowledge. This does not touch the thesis of this study, which concerns the servant, and the servant’s case is settled either way: whether or not God chooses, the servant’s act is necessary by another. The difficulty belongs to the schools. They call God “the Chooser” (al-mukhtār) and condemn the philosophers for making Him a necessitating cause; and the Muʿtazila who raise the objection are bound by it as well, since they too affirm that God knows from eternity everything He will do. The objection does not rescue the servant. It extends the conclusion to God, and leaves the schools to choose between giving up God’s choice and giving up His foreknowledge.

NoteThe other objections the Muʿtazila raised against this proof (that knowledge “follows the known,” and that knowledge is “disclosive, not efficacious”) are treated in Part Three, Chapter One; the objection that the proof would make the command and the threat unjust is treated in Chapter Three of this Part.

Chapter Two: The Paths of Escape from This Conclusion, and Their Critique

1. The Muʿtazila: the servant creates his act

This position collides directly with the text of al-Ṣāffāt (37:96, “And Allah created you and what you do”) and of al-Anfāl (8:17, “it was Allah who threw”), both of which state that the servant’s act is created by God. It also entails a creator besides God, which in the books of creed is called “associationism in creation” (al-shirk fī l-khalq). And the early generations themselves (not only the later ones) gave the sternest warning against this deviation. Abū Dāwūd reported from Ibn ʿUmar, from Mohammed:

Sunan Abī Dāwūd (4691); graded ḥasan by al-Albānī; there is a break in its chain, which al-Mundhirī pointed outSunnah.com

«القدرية مجوس هذه الأمة، إن مرضوا فلا تعودوهم، وإن ماتوا فلا تشهدوهم».

“The Qadariyya are the Magians of this Community: if they fall ill do not visit them, and if they die do not attend them.”

The point of resemblance with Magianism is that the Magians ascribe good to the “god of light” and evil to the “god of darkness,” thus affirming two creators; likewise the Qadariyya (among them the Muʿtazila) ascribe the creation of acts of obedience and disobedience to the servant independently of God, thus affirming (unwittingly) a creator alongside God.

As for the theory of “generation”: the causes and results that they claim the servant “creates” are themselves part of what is covered by “Allah is the Creator of all things.” A deeper blow can be borrowed from the seventeenth discussion of al-Ghazālī’s Tahāfut al-falāsifa, in which he denied any necessary connection between what is called a “cause” and what is called an “effect,” and held that the regular burning of cotton on contact with fire is only a custom God has established by His successive creation of these events, not the effect of a power residing in the fire. If no created cause has a real intrinsic effect, then all the more should the servant’s act (itself a created, originated thing) have no real intrinsic effect on what is generated from it.

Finally, even granting everything the Muʿtazila claim about the servant’s power, they affirm God’s eternal knowledge of every particular. The proof from foreknowledge (Chapter One) therefore stands against them whatever they say about the will: the side God knew would not occur is impossible to occur, and the power they ascribe to the servant has only one side left to act upon.

2. The Ashʿariyya: the theory of acquisition, determinism by their own definition

We do not need any outside critic to name this doctrine. Al-Shahrastānī, the Ashʿarī heresiographer, defines determinism, and his definition decides the matter:

al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa-l-niḥal, vol. 1, p. 85Shamela

الجبر هو نفي الفعل حقيقة عن العبد وإضافته إلى الرب تعالى، والجبرية أصناف. فالجبرية الخالصة: هي التي لا تثبت للعبد فعلا ولا قدرة على الفعل أصلا، والجبرية المتوسطة: هي التي تثبت للعبد قدرة غير مؤثرة أصلا، فأما من أثبت للقدرة الحادثة أثرا ما في الفعل، وسمي ذلك كسبا، فليس بجبري.

“Determinism is to deny the act in reality to the servant and to ascribe it to the Lord, the Exalted. The determinists are of kinds: the pure determinists are those who affirm for the servant neither an act nor any power to act; and the moderate determinists are those who affirm for the servant a power that has no effect at all. As for one who affirms for the originated power some effect in the act, and calls that acquisition, he is not a determinist.”

And the same al-Shahrastānī reports, a few pages later, the doctrine of al-Ashʿarī himself:

al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa-l-niḥal, vol. 1, p. 97 (on al-Ashʿarī)Shamela

ثم على أصل أبي الحسن: لا تأثير للقدرة الحادثة في الأحداث. لأن جهة الحدوث قضية واحدة لا تختلف بالنسبة إلى الجوهر والعرض.

“Then, on the principle of Abū l-Ḥasan: the originated power has no effect in bringing [anything] into being, since the aspect of origination is one and the same matter, whether for a substance or an accident.”

Put the two statements side by side: a determinist of the moderate kind is one who “affirms for the servant a power that has no effect at all”; and al-Ashʿarī’s principle is that “the originated power has no effect.” By al-Shahrastānī’s own definition, then, the founder of the school is a moderate determinist. Al-Shahrastānī exempts only those who give the originated power “some effect”, and that is the step later Ashʿarīs took precisely because they felt the force of this objection. Al-Juwaynī, as al-Shahrastānī reports him, said it plainly:

al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa-l-niḥal, vol. 1, p. 98Shamela

ثم إن إمام الحرمين أبا المعالي الجويني تخطى عن هذا البيان قليلا. قال: أما نفي هذه القدرة والاستطاعة فمما يأباه العقل والحس، وأما إثبات قدرة لا أثر لها بوجه فهو كنفي القدرة أصلا.

“Then Imām al-Ḥaramayn Abū l-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī went a little beyond this account. He said: As for denying this power and capacity, reason and sense reject it; but affirming a power that has no effect in any way is like denying power altogether.”

So al-Juwaynī, the teacher of al-Ghazālī, judged the founder’s doctrine of a power without effect to be “like denying power altogether”, that is, pure determinism under another name. The later Ashʿarīs who, like al-Juwaynī and al-Bāqillānī, gave the created power “some effect” do not escape either: the effect they give it is itself an originated thing that needs a preponderator, and the proof of Chapter One and the division of “Sharpening the Sight” apply to it in full. Either acquisition has no effect (and it is the moderate determinism of al-Shahrastānī’s definition) or it has an effect, and then that effect needs a preponderator which can only come from outside the servant, which is the predicament of the Muʿtazila.

Al-Rāzī reports where al-Juwaynī finally settled, and names the company it put him in:

al-Rāzī, al-Muḥaṣṣal, vol. 1, p. 455Eshia

وزعم إمام الحرمين أن الله تعالى يوجد للعبد القدرة والإرادة، ثم هما يوجبان وجود المقدور. وهذا قول الفلاسفة، ومن المعتزلة قول أبي الحسين البصري.

“Imām al-Ḥaramayn held that God creates for the servant the power and the will, and these two then necessitate the existence of the act. This is the view of the philosophers, and among the Muʿtazila the view of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.”

So the Ashʿarī master who rejected a power without effect did not return to the Muʿtazila. He moved to necessitation: God creates the power and the will, and they make the act necessary. That is the thesis of this study.

It became proverbial among the theologians themselves to say “more obscure than al-Ashʿarī’s acquisition,” and Ibn Ḥazm, in al-Faṣl fī l-milal, held that the theory is no more than a name without reality that tries to reconcile two contradictories: denying that the servant creates his act, and affirming his responsibility for it. There is a further angle drawn from the heart of the school’s own method: Ashʿarī kalām holds that the world is atoms and accidents, that accidents do not endure for two moments but are created anew by God at every instant, and that no created substance or accident has a real power to produce another. What rational justification remains for making the servant’s act alone an exception in which an originated power has a real effect, while no such exception is allowed anywhere else in the universe?

Al-Rāzī himself sets out the decisive objection to acquisition in al-Muḥaṣṣal. He gives it in the voice of the Muʿtazila (it is their reply to the Ashʿarī appeal to kasb) but it is worth quoting in full, because of what he does with it next:

The Muʿtazila, as set out by al-Rāzī, al-Muḥaṣṣal, vol. 1, p. 470Eshia

إن العبد إما أن يكون مستبدا بإدخال شيء في الوجود وإما أن لا يكون، فهذا نفي وإثبات، ولا واسطة بينهما. فإن كان الأول، فقد سلمتم قول المعتزلة. وإن كان الثاني كان العبد مضطرا؛ لأن الله تعالى إذا خلقه في العبد حصل لا محالة، وإذا لم يخلقه استحال حصوله فيه، فكان العبد مضطرا، فتعود الإشكالات. وعند هذا التحقيق فيظهر أن الكسب اسم بلا مسمى.

“The servant either has the independent power to bring something into existence or he does not, this is negation and affirmation, with no middle between them. If the first, you have conceded the Muʿtazilī position. If the second, the servant is compelled: for if God creates it in the servant it occurs without fail, and if He does not create it, its occurrence in him is impossible; so the servant is compelled, and the difficulties return. At this verification it becomes clear that acquisition is a name without a referent.”

Al-Rāzī does not answer by defending acquisition. He answers by showing that the same objection falls on the Muʿtazila, and the two reasons he gives are exactly the two strands of the proof of Chapter One, foreknowledge and the created motive:

al-Rāzī, al-Muḥaṣṣal, vol. 1, p. 471Eshia

والجواب: أن هذه الإشكالات واردة على المعتزلة؛ لأن ما علم الله تعالى أنه يوجد كان واجب الوقوع، وما علم الله تعالى أنه لا يوجد كان ممتنع الوقوع، ولأنه إن لم يوجد رجحان الداعي امتنع الفعل وإن وجد وجب. فكان الإشكال واردا عليهم في هذين المقامين. ولقد كان واحد من أذكياء المعتزلة يقول: هذان السؤالان هما العدوان للاعتزال، ولولاهما لتم الدست لنا.

“The answer: these difficulties fall on the Muʿtazila; because what God knew would exist was necessary to occur, and what God knew would not exist was impossible to occur, and because if the preponderance of the motive is absent the act is impossible, and if it is present the act is necessary. So the difficulty falls on them at these two points. One of the cleverest of the Muʿtazila used to say: ‘These two questions are the two enemies of Muʿtazilism; were it not for them, the game would have been ours.’”

Put together, the two pages say everything this study says. The objection: without independent power, “acquisition is a name without a referent.” The reply: the Muʿtazila cannot escape either, because the known side is necessary, the unknown side impossible, and the motive decides. Al-Rāzī rescues acquisition from the Muʿtazila only by handing both schools the same determinism.

Al-Taftāzānī, commenting for Ashʿarīs and Māturīdīs alike, closes the question of servants’ acts in Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid with a section titled “Conclusion, on settling the dispute,” and its verdict is this:

al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, vol. 4, p. 263Eshia

فالحق أنه لا جبر ولا تفويض، ولكن أمر بين أمرين، إذ المبادي القريبة على الاختيار، والبعيدة على الاضطرارية [كذا]، فالإنسان مضطر في صورة المختار.

“The truth is that there is neither compulsion nor delegation, but a matter between the two: for the proximate principles are by choice and the remote ones by compulsion; so man is compelled in the guise of one who chooses.”

The “matter between the two” ends in one of the two. Choice is granted only to the proximate principles; the remote ones (where the choice itself comes from) are compulsion. And what is compelled at its source is compelled, whatever it looks like at the surface: “compelled in the guise of one who chooses.”

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, the last Shaykh al-Islām of the Ottoman state and a Māturīdī-Ashʿarī defender of the decree, went further than any of them. He accepted the name “moderate determinism” and denied that “moderate” softens it:

Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, Mawqif al-ʿaql wa-l-ʿilm wa-l-ʿālam, vol. 3, pp. 404–405, as quoted in the Multaqā Ahl al-Ḥadīth archive (al-Maktaba al-Shāmila al-Ḥadītha), p. 203al-Maktaba

وهو - أي الجبر الذي نختاره - ما يسمى الجبر المتوسط … وليس معنى الجبر المتوسط أنه جبر متوسط القوة لا شديدها كالجبر الذي في مذهب الجبرية الضالين. إذ لا فرق بين الجبرين في المذهبين من حيث القوة والتأثير، حتى إن الجبر الذي نقول به يفوق الإكراه في القوة … إذ الإنسان يفعل ما يفعله عندنا بإرادته واختياره، إلا أنه لا يريد ولا يختار إلا ما يريد الله ويختاره له، فكأنه مجبور من غير جبر.

“The determinism we choose is what is called moderate determinism … And moderate determinism does not mean a determinism of moderate strength rather than severe, unlike the determinism of the misguided Jabriyya. For there is no difference between the two determinisms in the two schools in strength and effect, so much so that the determinism we hold exceeds coercion in strength … For on our view man does what he does by his will and choice, except that he wills and chooses only what God wills and chooses for him; so it is as if he were compelled without compulsion.”

This is the end of the road the schools set out on. Ṣabrī names his own doctrine determinism, says it is no weaker than that of the Jabriyya and stronger than coercion, and keeps the word “choice” only because the compelled will is never contradicted, since it is made to will what God wills. That is the thesis of this study, in the words of the Ottoman Shaykh al-Islām.

3. The Māturīdiyya: the optional part

This faces exactly the problem that faced Ashʿarī acquisition: either this “part” is a real effect in the existence of the act, which returns us to the Muʿtazilī claim that the servant creates his act; or it is not, and it falls into the same name without a referent. A further methodological critique applies: the Sunnīs universally, Ashʿarīs and Māturīdīs alike, divide existents into two categories with no third: a real existent, with external realisation, and a mental or considered one, a relation or addition with no realisation except in rational consideration, like fatherhood and sonship. The agreed rule is that purely considered things and relations are not described as having effect or producing anything at all. If the “optional part” is a purely relational matter, the Māturīdiyya have committed themselves to its belonging to the category the theologians agree has no effect; to then make it the ground of choice (the weightiest effect in existence) is an explicit contradiction. And whatever the part is, it is either possible or not; if it is possible and originated, it needs a preponderator, and the division of “Sharpening the Sight” applies to it.

4. Ibn Taymiyya and the Atharīs: the servant’s power is a real cause

The answer most often given today by Sunnī defenders of free will is Ibn Taymiyya’s. Against the Ashʿarīs he holds that the servant’s power really does have an effect, as a cause has an effect, and that the servant is the real doer of his act. Against the Muʿtazila he holds that God creates the power, the will and the act.

Ibn Taymiyya binds himself in three places on the same pages.

First, by his own comparison. He says God creates the servant’s act “by means of His creating the servant’s will and power, as He creates effects by their causes”, and gives the examples:

Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya, in the section on the decreeWikisource

وهو خلقها بمشيئة نفسه وقدرة نفسه بواسطة خلقه لمشيئة العبد وقدرته كما يخلق المسببات بأسبابها فيخلق السحاب بالريح والمطر بالسحاب والنبات بالمطر

“He created them by His own will and His own power, by means of His creating the servant’s will and power, as He creates effects by their causes: He creates the cloud by the wind, the rain by the cloud, and plants by the rain.”

The servant’s will stands to his act as the wind stands to the cloud. This is the comparison Jahm made with “the tree bore fruit” and “the water flowed” (Appendix), now made by the Shaykh al-Islām of the Atharīs. A will that is to the act what the wind is to the cloud is a link in a chain that God creates, and it can no more turn the chain aside than the wind can.

Second, by the proof from preponderance. Arguing against the Imāmī, he uses the very argument of this Part:

Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya, in the section on the decreeWikisource

فإذا كانت هذه القدرة المخلوقة فيه موجودة قبل حدوث الفعل وحين حدوثه فلا بد من سبب آخر حادث ينضم إليها وإلا لزم ترجيح أحد المثلين على الآخر بلا مرجح وحدوث الحوادث بلا سبب حادث

“If this power created in him exists before the act occurs and when it occurs, there must be another originated cause joined to it; otherwise one of two like things would be preponderated over the other without a preponderator, and originated things would occur without an originated cause.”

Third, by necessitation. In the tenth reply on the same page he adopts the principle of Abū l-Ḥusayn, “with the presence of the motive and the power, the existence of the act is necessary,” and calls it “the view of the verifiers of the people of the Sunna” (quoted in Part Three, Chapter Four).

Chapter Three: Accountability Together with Determinism, and the Question of Justice

1. The schools’ answer on accountability: the compulsion is moved, not removed

The greatest objection remains: how can a human being be charged and held accountable while compelled? The schools answer that accountability does not require the possibility of the opposite act: it is enough that the act issue from the person by his originated power and created will, in conformity with what he himself wills, and not by an outward force, like one pushed off a height. The sleeper who turns over in his sleep is not accountable because his act is not from his will at all; the unbeliever and the sinner act from a real will and desire. But this answer moves the compulsion; it does not remove it. The man pushed off a height is compelled in his body; the sinner is compelled in his will, for that will is itself created in him by God, in agreement with His prior knowledge, and “you do not will except that Allah wills.” The second compulsion is the more complete, because nothing in the person is left outside it. Mohammed himself, asked “Should we not remain on what is written for us?”, did not deny that the writing comes first: he commanded action and affirmed the writing together. So the schools hold the servant to account for acts he was compelled to will. Whether that is just is the next question.

2. The question of justice: holding the schools to their own verses

Accountability answered in this way leaves a second question, which the Companion ʿImrān ibn al-Ḥuṣayn asked in so many words: “Would that not then be injustice?” (no. 11 above). The Qurʾān denies injustice of God in the plainest terms:

al-Nisāʾ 4:40

﴿إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَظْلِمُ مِثْقَالَ ذَرَّةٍ﴾

“Indeed, Allah does not wrong [anyone] by an atom’s weight.”

al-Kahf 18:49

﴿وَوَجَدُوا مَا عَمِلُوا حَاضِرًا ۗ وَلَا يَظْلِمُ رَبُّكَ أَحَدًا﴾

“And they will find what they did present [before them]. And your Lord does not wrong anyone.”

Fuṣṣilat 41:46

﴿مَّنْ عَمِلَ صَالِحًا فَلِنَفْسِهِ ۖ وَمَنْ أَسَاءَ فَعَلَيْهَا ۗ وَمَا رَبُّكَ بِظَلَّامٍ لِّلْعَبِيدِ﴾

“Whoever does righteousness, it is for his soul; and whoever does evil, it is against it. And your Lord is not ever unjust to [His] servants.”

The Muʿtazila took these verses at their ordinary meaning: to punish a servant for an act whose will God created and whose occurrence God made necessary would be injustice; therefore, they concluded, God does not create the servant’s act. Parts One and Two have shown that this conclusion cannot stand against the texts and against reason. The Ashʿarīs, for their part, kept the decree and answered the objection in another way:

Al-Rāzī meets the same objection in al-Muḥaṣṣal, put by the Muʿtazila as a rational argument, and his last word is the same appeal to God’s being beyond question:

al-Rāzī, al-Muḥaṣṣal, vol. 1, pp. 458–459Eshia

فعل العبد لو كان بخلق الله تعالى، لما كان متمكنا من الفعل البتة، لأنه إن خلقه الله تعالى فيه لكان واجب الحصول، وإن لم يخلقه الله تعالى فيه كان ممتنع الحصول. ولو لم يكن العبد متمكنا من الفعل والترك، لكانت أفعاله جارية مجرى حركات الجمادات … والجواب إنه لازم عليكم، لأن الأمر إن توجه حال استواء الدواعي، ففي تلك الحالة يمتنع الترجيح، وإن توجه حال الرجحان، فهناك الراجح واجب، والمرجوح ممتنع. ولأن ذلك الفعل إن علم الله تعالى وجوده فهو واجب، وإن علم الله تعالى عدمه فهو ممتنع. فثبت أن الإشكال وارد على الكل، وأن الجواب هو أنه تعالى ﴿لا يسأل عما يفعل وهم يسألون﴾.

“If the servant’s act were by God’s creation, he would not be able to act at all: if God creates it in him it is necessary, and if God does not create it in him it is impossible. And if the servant could not do or omit, his acts would be like the movements of inanimate things … The answer: this binds you too. For if the command is addressed while the motives are equal, preponderance is then impossible; and if it is addressed while one side preponderates, the preponderant side is necessary and the other impossible. And because if God knew that the act would exist it is necessary, and if God knew it would not exist it is impossible. So the difficulty falls on everyone, and the answer is that He “is not asked about what He does, but they will be asked” (Q 21:23).”

Al-Rāzī concedes the whole premise of the objection, that the act is necessary or impossible and never open, and adds that the Muʿtazila are in the same position. On justice he offers no rational answer at all. He offers the verse. That is the ownership answer of Abū l-Aswad again, given by the greatest Ashʿarī theologian after he had granted everything this study argues.

The Qurʾān does not speak of justice as an empty tautology. It praises God for not wronging “an atom’s weight,” it sets His justice against what humans would recognise as wrong, and it makes the sending of messengers a reason why “people would have no argument against Allah” (Q 4:165), an argument that is meaningful only if “injustice” has a content independent of whatever God happens to do. The Ashʿarī answer keeps the words of these verses and empties them of that content. This study does not need to decide between the Muʿtazilī and the Ashʿarī notions of justice: on the texts and on reason, the decree and the creation of the will stand, as Parts One and Two have shown. What follows is a dilemma for the schools, not for the thesis. On the Muʿtazilī notion of justice, the decree that the texts establish makes the punishment of the damned what the Muʿtazila themselves call injustice. On the Ashʿarī notion, God’s justice is preserved only by definition, which is the price of keeping both the decree and the verses.

Chapter Four: Further Rational Proofs from the Books of the Theologians

Al-Rāzī gives the rational proofs for the Ashʿarī position in al-Muḥaṣṣal and sets them out at greater length in his last great work, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya. The proof from preponderance has been given in Chapter One. The proofs that follow come from al-Maṭālib, from the standard Ashʿarī manuals (al-Ashʿarī’s al-Lumaʿ, al-Bāqillānī’s Tamhīd, al-Ghazālī’s al-Iqtiṣād, al-Ījī’s al-Mawāqif), and from al-Sanūsī’s creed. Each shows that the servant is compelled in his act, and each is built from premises the Ashʿarīs, and often the Muʿtazila too, use elsewhere in their own creed. For each, the steps are set out first and the binding point after them. Two witnesses close the chapter: al-Sanūsī, and Ibn Ḥazm, an enemy of the Jabriyya.

1. The proof from ignorance of the details

In al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya al-Rāzī gives this as his fourth proof, and supports its first premise with the Qurʾān and with reason:

al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, pp. 84–85; more briefly in al-Muḥaṣṣal, vol. 1, p. 457Internet Archive

البرهان الرابع: لو كان العبد موجدا لأفعال نفسه، لكان عالما بتفاصيل أفعال نفسه، وهو غير عالم بتفاصيل أفعال نفسه، فوجب أن لا يكون موجدا لأفعال نفسه … أما القرآن: فهو قوله: ﴿ألا يعلم من خلق﴾، استنكر أن يكون الخالق للشيء غير عالم به. وأما البرهان: فهو أن العبد يمكنه أن يأتي بالأزيد مما أتى به، وبالأنقص عما أتى به، وبفعل آخر مغاير لما أتى به. فلما كان قادرا على الكل، كان رجحان بعض هذه الممكنات على البعض لا بد أن يكون لأجل أن القادر المختار خصص ذلك النوع وذلك المقدار بالوقوع، دون المغاير ودون الأزيد والأنقص. لكن القصد إلى إيقاع الشيء بقدر خاص وكيفية خاصة مشروط بالعلم بذلك القدر، لأن القصد إلى الشيء بدون الشعور بماهيته محال.

“The fourth proof: if the servant were the originator of his own acts, he would know the details of his own acts; but he does not know the details of his own acts; so he is not the originator of his own acts … As for the Qurʾān, it is His saying: ‘Does He not know, He who created?’ (Q 67:14), which denies that the creator of a thing could be ignorant of it. As for the rational proof: the servant could have done more than he did, or less, or something else. Since he had power over all of these, the preponderance of some of these possibles over others must be because the capable chooser specified that kind and that amount to occur, rather than the other, the greater or the lesser. But the intention to bring about a thing in a specific amount and manner is conditional on knowing that amount, for intending a thing without awareness of what it is is impossible.”

For the second premise he gives several cases. The strongest is speech, which is among the most precise acts a human performs:

al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, pp. 88–89Internet Archive

إن الصبي … قادر على الإتيان بالحروف المخصوصة، وذلك لأن الكلام عبارة عن الحروف المتوالية المتعاقبة … لكن الإتيان بكل واحد من هذه الحروف المخصوصة إنما يكون بآلة مخصوصة، على كيفية مخصوصة، ووضع تلك الآلات على وجه مخصوص، وهي: الحلق واللسان والشفتان والأسنان، وتركيب بعض هذه الأعضاء مع بعض … لكنا نعلم أن جمهور الخلائق يتكلمون بهذه الحروف المخصوصة، مع أنه لا يخطر ببالهم كيفية أحوال هذه الأعضاء اللواتي هي الآلات في إيجاد الحروف المخصوصة، ولا يخطر ببالهم كيفية تلك الأوضاع التي باعتبارها يتمكنون من التلفظ بهذه الحروف.

“The child … is able to produce the specific letters, for speech consists of letters following one another … But producing each of these specific letters is only by a specific organ, in a specific manner, with those organs placed in a specific way: the throat, the tongue, the lips and the teeth, and the joining of some of these organs with others … Yet we know that most people speak these specific letters although the states of these organs, which are the instruments for producing the letters, never cross their minds, nor do the positions that enable them to pronounce these letters.”

He adds that a man who walks from one place to another does not know how many parts of his body he moved, how many places he passed through, or how many instants the movement took; and that the slow movement of an ant has a degree of slowness, among countless possible degrees, that the ant cannot perceive (vol. 9, pp. 85–87).

The objector may answer that the servant intends the act as a whole, and the details follow by themselves. Al-Rāzī’s reasoning answers this: the details are themselves among the possibles. The same sentence can be spoken faster or slower, louder or softer, with a hundred variations; that one of them occurs rather than the others needs a specifier, and a specifier that does not know what it specifies is not a chooser. If the details “follow by themselves,” they follow from something other than the servant’s intention, and that is the conclusion of the proof.

2. The proof from mutual hindrance

Al-Rāzī states it in al-Muḥaṣṣal and again, as his third proof, in al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya:

al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, p. 83; and al-Muḥaṣṣal, vol. 1, pp. 457–458Internet Archive

البرهان الثالث: لو كان العبد موجدا لأفعال نفسه، لكنا إذا فرضنا أنه إذا حاول تحريك جسم، وفرضنا أن الله تعالى حاول تسكينه، فإما أن يقع المرادان، أو لا يقع واحد منهما، أو يقع أحدهما دون الثاني. والأقسام الثلاثة باطلة، فالقول بأن العبد موجد باطل. إنما قلنا إنه يمتنع حصول المرادين، لأنه يلزم أن يصير الجسم الواحد، في الوقت الواحد، متحركا وساكنا معا، وهو محال.

“The third proof: if the servant were the originator of his own acts, then if we suppose that he tries to move a body, and suppose that God tries to keep it at rest, either both things willed occur, or neither occurs, or one occurs and not the other. All three divisions are false, so the claim that the servant is an originator is false. We said both things willed cannot occur because that would require the one body, at the one time, to be moving and at rest together, which is impossible.”

He then closes it with a remark that is the heart of the binding argument:

al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, p. 84Internet Archive

واعلم: أن هذا الدليل هو الدليل المشهور، المذكور في إثبات أن إله العالم واحد.

“Know that this proof is the well-known proof given to establish that the God of the world is one.”

The Ashʿarīs read that proof in the Qurʾān: “Had there been within them gods besides Allah, they would both have been ruined” (Q 21:22). Al-Rāzī gives it a few pages earlier in al-Muḥaṣṣal:

al-Rāzī, al-Muḥaṣṣal, vol. 1, pp. 452–453 (on the oneness of God)Eshia

الإله تعالى واحد، لأنا لو قدرنا إلهين، لكان إما أن يصح من أحدهما أن يفعل فعلا على خلاف الآخر، أو لا يصح … وعند وقوع ذلك الاختلاف، فإما أن يحصل مرادهما فيكون الجسم الواحد متحركا ساكنا، أو لا يحصل مرادهما، وهو أيضا محال … أو يحصل مراد أحدهما دون مراد الثاني، وهو أيضا محال.

“God is one, because if we supposed two gods, it would either be possible for one of them to do an act contrary to the other, or not … and when that disagreement occurs, either what both will occurs, so that the one body is moving and at rest; or what neither wills occurs, which is also impossible … or what one wills occurs and not what the other wills, which is also impossible.”

The binding point. The Muʿtazilī will say step 4 fails: two gods would be equal in power, but God’s power is greater than the servant’s, so God’s will prevails. That reply puts him before a dilemma:

3. The chain of the soul: man is compelled in his very choosing

This is the proof al-Rāzī calls decisive, and it reaches compulsion without passing through God’s knowledge at all. He first lists the causes that shape a man’s beliefs and character: three inside him (the innate nature of his soul, the temperament of his body, the make of his organs) and three outside him (upbringing and habit, worldly interest, practice in reasoning). None of them is chosen. He then follows a single voluntary act from its first beginning to its occurrence:

al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, pp. 41–42 (first section, third proof)Internet Archive

فنقول: قد بينا أنه إذا حصل التصور، فإن كان التصور نافعا، مال الطبع إليه، شاء الإنسان أم أبى … وإذا حصل هذا الإجماع التام الجازم، حصل الفعل لا محالة. فثبت: أن ترتب كل واحد من هذه المراتب على ما قبله: ترتب ضروري.

“We say: we have shown that when the conception occurs, if the thing conceived is beneficial, nature inclines to it, whether the man wills or not … and when this complete, decisive resolve occurs, the act occurs without fail. So it is established that the following of each of these stages upon the one before it is a necessary following.”

Can the servant at least choose the first conception, from which the chain starts? Al-Rāzī answers that choosing it would need an earlier conception, and so on without end:

al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, pp. 42–43Internet Archive

فإن كان ذلك أيضا بفعله، لزم إما التسلسل وإما الدور. وهما باطلان. ولما بطل ذلك، ثبت انتهاء هذه التصورات إلى تصور أول، هو المبدأ للأفعال الاختيارية، لذلك الحيوان. وثبت: أن حصول ذلك التصور ليس باختيار العبد، بل هو حاصل في قلبه، على سبيل الاضطرار. ثم إذا حصل ذلك التصور، ترتبت تلك المراتب بعضها على بعض، بالغة ما بلغت، ترتبا واجبا لازما اضطراريا. وعند هذا يظهر أن الإنسان مضطر في اختياره، وأن جميع أفعال العباد: إما أفعال الله تعالى، أو موجبات أفعال الله تعالى.

“If that too were by his act, either an infinite regress or a circle would follow, and both are false. Since that is false, it is established that these conceptions end in a first conception, which is the starting point of that animal’s voluntary acts. And it is established that the occurrence of that conception is not by the servant’s choice: it occurs in his heart by compulsion. Then, once that conception occurs, those stages follow one upon another, however far they go, in a necessary, binding, compelled order. And here it becomes clear that man is compelled in his choosing, and that all the acts of the servants are either acts of God or things necessitated by the acts of God.”

He adds that the first conception often comes by outside chance (a thing a man happens to see, or a sound he happens to hear), which is plainly beyond his power. After weighing the case where the causes conflict, he gives the verdict in so many words:

al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, p. 44Internet Archive

وإن اختلط البعض بالبعض، وتعارضت وتقاومت فالعبرة بالطرف الراجح فثبت بما ذكرنا: أن الجبر لازم على جميع التقديرات.

“And if some are mixed with others, and they conflict and resist one another, what counts is the side that prevails. So it is established by what we have said that compulsion is entailed on every supposition.”

Al-Rāzī answers the objection by dividing it:

al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, pp. 44–45Internet Archive

إن عنيت به أنه يمكن أن يعرض له في مقابلة تلك الخواطر: خاطر آخر … فنحن نسلم … إلا أن على هذا التقدير، صارت تلك الدواعي التي ذكرناها، معارضة بهذه الداعية … ونحن بينا: أن الفعل إنما يجب عند حصول الداعية الجازمة … وإن أردتم أن تلك الدواعي حال بقائها على قوتها وسلامتها عن المعارض، يمكن أن لا توجد الفعل. فهذا ممنوع. وكيف يمكن أن يقال: الإنسان حال اجتماع تلك الأسباب الموجبة للأفعال الغضبية، وبراءتها عن الدواعي المعارضة لها، فإنه يمكن أن لا يأتي بتلك الأفعال؟

“If you mean that another thought may come to him against those thoughts … we grant it … but on that supposition those motives we mentioned have become opposed by this motive … and we have shown that the act is necessary only when the motive is decisive … And if you mean that those motives, while they remain at full strength and free of any opposition, may fail to bring about the act, that is denied. How can it be said that a man in whom the causes necessitating the acts of anger are gathered, free of any motive opposing them, can fail to do those acts?”

The “power to refrain” therefore exists only where a contrary motive has come, and the contrary motive is itself a link the servant did not choose. Commenting on a related passage, al-Rāzī states the result: the acts of the heart follow one another by necessity, and “there is no room for the servant to cut one of them off from another” (vol. 9, p. 46).

4. Beliefs are not chosen: faith and unbelief are compelled

Faith (īmān) and unbelief (kufr) are, for every Sunnī school, the acts on which eternal reward and punishment turn. Both are beliefs. Al-Rāzī gives a whole section of al-Maṭālib to proving that no belief, true or false, is chosen. His first proof starts from the self-evident truths:

al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, pp. 101–102 (third section, first proof)Internet Archive

فإذا كانت تلك البديهيات غير مقدورة البتة، وكان استلزامها لهذه النظريات استلزاما ضروريا، غير داخل تحت الاختيار. وجب القطع بأن هذه النتائج غير داخلة تحت القدرة والاختيار … فثبت: أن شيئا من العلوم والمعارف غير واقع بقدرة [العبد] واختياره.

“So if those self-evident truths are not within power at all, and their entailing of these acquired conclusions is a necessary entailment that does not fall under choice, it must be affirmed with certainty that these conclusions do not fall under power and choice … So it is established that no knowledge or cognition occurs by the servant’s power and choice.”

His third proof shows that no one can make himself a knower, because aiming at knowledge rather than error already needs the knowledge:

al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, pp. 107–108Internet Archive

فثبت: أنه لا يمكن أن يجعل نفسه عالما بذلك الشيء، إلا إذا كان قد عرف أولا حال ذلك الشيء. وذلك يقتضي كون الشيء مشروطا بنفسه. وهو محال. فثبت: أن إقدار الانسان على جعل نفسه، عالما بشيء: أمر محال … فثبت بهذه البراهين القاطعة: أن كل ما حصل في قلوب الخلق وعقولهم من العلوم والجهالات، فالكل من الله [وبإيجاد الله].

“So it is established that he cannot make himself a knower of that thing unless he has first known the state of that thing; and that requires the thing to be conditioned on itself, which is impossible. So it is established that empowering man to make himself a knower of anything is impossible … So it is established by these decisive proofs that all the knowledge and ignorance that occurs in the hearts and minds of creatures is all from God, and by God’s bringing it into being.”

Al-Rāzī answers in two ways:

al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, pp. 108–109Internet Archive

الأول: إن تلك الجهالات لا تتسلسل، بل تنتهي إلى جهل أول. فيكون خالقه هو الله سبحانه. والثاني: إن استلزام تلك العلوم المتقدمة لتلك العلوم التي هي النتائج، يجب أن تكون ضرورية … وعلى هذا التقدير يكون الكل من الله تعالى.

“First: those errors do not regress without end but end in a first error, whose creator is God, glorified is He. Second: the entailing of the conclusions by the earlier knowledge must be necessary … and on this supposition the whole is from God, the Exalted.”

5. The truth of statements about the future

This proof does not rest on God’s knowledge either, but on the law that of two contradictory statements one is true. Al-Rāzī argues that “Zayd will write tomorrow” and “Zayd will not write tomorrow” cannot both lack truth, since truth and falsity are opposed as affirmation and negation; so one of them is true now. Then:

al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, p. 61 (first section, sixth proof)Internet Archive

إذا ثبت هذا، فنقول: إن هذا يقتضي أن تكون جميع الحوادث المستقبلة: مقدرة على وجه، يمتنع تطرق الزيادة والنقصان والتغيير إليها. على ما هو مذهبنا في مسألة القضاء والقدر.

“If this is established, we say: this requires that all future events be determined in a way into which no increase, decrease or change can enter, as is our doctrine on the question of the decree and predestination.”

al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, pp. 62–63Internet Archive

واعلم: أن هذا البرهان قد دل على أن جميع الحوادث المستقبلة، مترتبة في أنفسها ترتبا، يمتنع على المتقدم أن يصير متأخرا، أو على المتأخر أن يصير متقدما. وذلك يبطل الاعتزال بالكلية … وذلك الغير ليس هو العبد. لأن هذا الوجوب حاصل قبل قصد العبد إلى إيجاده، بل حاصل قبل وجود العبد.

“Know that this proof has shown that all future events are ordered in themselves in such a way that the earlier cannot become later nor the later earlier, and that refutes the Muʿtazilī position entirely … and that other is not the servant, because this necessity is present before the servant intends to bring the act about, indeed before the servant exists.”

Al-Rāzī ranks this proof above the proof from knowledge, because it rests on a premise known by self-evidence:

al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, vol. 9, pp. 64–65Internet Archive

وأما البرهان المبني على اعتبار أحوال النقيضين في الصدق والكذب. فهو مبني على أن النقيضين المختلفين بالسلب والإيجاب، فإنه يجب أن تكون إحداهما صادقة والأخرى كاذبة. وهي مقدمة معلومة بالبديهة. فلا جرم كان هذا البرهان أقرب إلى التقرير، وأبعد عن الشكوك والشبهات.

“As for the proof built on the states of two contradictories in truth and falsity, it is built on this: of two contradictories differing by negation and affirmation, one must be true and the other false, and that is a premise known by self-evidence. So this proof is, without doubt, the easier to establish and the further from doubts and objections.”

Just before it, al-Rāzī gives a shorter proof that turns foreknowledge into causation. Firm knowledge that a possible thing will occur is possible “only by way of knowing its cause and what necessitates it” (vol. 9, p. 59). Nothing of the servant exists from eternity, “so what makes it occur must be the power and will of God” (vol. 9, p. 59). And it cannot be the knowledge itself, “because knowledge attaches to the known as it is: it follows the known and does not make it follow” (vol. 9, p. 64). God does not only know the servant’s act in advance: He knows it because He fixed its cause.

6. Ashʿarī ethics stands on compulsion: “the servant is compelled in his acts”

The Ashʿarīs deny that reason can know good and evil (al-ḥusn wa-l-qubḥ) before revelation. In al-Mawāqif, the standard textbook of later Ashʿarī theology, al-Ījī gives as the first proof of this doctrine that the servant is compelled, and proves the compulsion by division:

al-Ījī, al-Mawāqif, ed. ʿUmayra (Dār al-Jīl, 1997), vol. 3, p. 263OpenITI

لنا وجهان الأول أن العبد مجبور في أفعاله وإذا كان كذلك لم يحكم العقل فيها بحسن ولا قبح اتفاقا بيانه أن العبد إن لم يتمكن من الترك فذاك هو الجبر وإن تمكن ولم يتوقف على مرجح بل صدر عنه تارة ولم يصدر عنه أخرى من غير سبب كان ذلك اتفاقيا وإن توقف على مرجح لم يكن ذلك من العبد وإلا تسلسل ووجب الفعل عنده وإلا جاز معه الفعل والترك فاحتاج إلى مرجح آخر وتسلسل فيكون اضطراريا وعلى التقادير فلا اختيار للعبد فيكون مجبورا.

“We have two arguments. The first: the servant is compelled in his acts, and if so, reason does not judge them good or evil, by agreement. Its explanation: if the servant cannot omit the act, that is compulsion; if he can, and it does not depend on a preponderator but issues from him at one time and not at another without a cause, it is chance; and if it depends on a preponderator, that preponderator is not from the servant (otherwise a regress follows), and the act is necessary with it (otherwise both doing and omitting would remain admissible with it, and it would need another preponderator, and a regress follows), so it is compelled. On every supposition the servant has no choice, so he is compelled.”

The commentary printed with the text in this edition then closes the way out that a later Ashʿarī might take, namely that the servant is “compelled” only in the weak sense of not being independent:

al-Ījī, al-Mawāqif, with the commentary, ed. ʿUmayra, vol. 3, p. 274OpenITI

فمقصودنا من دليلنا على كون العبد مجبورا ومضطرا أن العبد غير مستقل بإيجاد فعله من غير داع واختيار يترتب على ذلك الداعي ويوجب الفعل يحصل أي ذلك الداعي مع ما يترتب عليه له بخلق الله تعالى إياه … إذ لا فرق بين أن يوجد الله الفعل في العبد كما قاله الشيخ وبين أن يوجد ما يجب الفعل عنده كما قال بعض أصحابه كإمام الحرمين.

“Our aim in our proof that the servant is compelled and constrained is that the servant is not independent in bringing about his act without a motive, and a choice that follows that motive and necessitates the act, both of which come to him by God’s creating them … for there is no difference between God bringing the act into being in the servant, as the Shaykh [al-Ashʿarī] said, and His bringing into being what makes the act necessary, as some of his followers said, such as Imām al-Ḥaramayn.”

On the same page the commentary states the regress for the servant in one sentence: the preponderator of the servant’s act is originated and needs a cause, “so if its cause is the servant, there is a regress, and if it is another, he is compelled in his act” (vol. 3, p. 274). It also explains why the same reasoning does not make God compelled: God’s preponderator is His eternal will, while the servant’s will “rests on something other than him, so if it necessitates, compulsion follows in his case with certainty” (vol. 3, p. 274). This is the distinction drawn in “Sharpening the Sight” (Part Four), and the concession made in Chapter One stands beside it.

7. Further proofs in brief

The Ashʿarī books contain further proofs that reach the same conclusion by other roads. They are given here briefly, each with its source and its binding point.

(a) The act comes out against the agent’s intention

Al-Ashʿarī’s own rational proof for the creation of acts. The unbeliever intends his unbelief to be true and good, and it occurs false and evil; the believer would have his faith free of toil, and it occurs toilsome. An act occurs as it really is only from one who intended it so; so the maker of each is someone other than the servant:

al-Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʿ, ed. Ḥammūda Ghurāba (al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth), pp. 71–72OpenITI

ووجدنا الكفار يقصد ويجهل نفسه الى أن يكون الكفر حسنا حقا فيكون بخلاف قصده … فقد وجب أن يكون للكفر محدث أحدثه كفرا باطلا قبيحا وهو قاصد الى ذلك، ولن يجوز أن يكون المحدث له هو الكافر الذي يريد أن يكون الكفر حسنا صوابا حقا فيكون على خلاف ذلك.

“We find that the unbeliever aims and strains himself for unbelief to be good and true, and it turns out contrary to his intention … so unbelief must have an originator who originated it as false and evil unbelief, intending that; and the originator of it cannot be the unbeliever, who wants unbelief to be good, right and true, and it turns out otherwise.”

Al-Rāzī gives the same proof as his tenth: “if the servant’s act came about by the servant’s bringing it into being, he would find only what he willed; and the consequent is false” (vol. 9, p. 97). People seek truth and land in error. When the objector says the unbeliever chose error because he thought it true, al-Rāzī traces that earlier error back to a first error that no one chose, and concludes: “all errors occur in the servant by compulsion, not by choice” (vol. 9, p. 99). Binding point: the Ashʿarīs hold this proof as their founder’s; the Muʿtazila hold that an agent knows and intends what he makes.

(b) The created power exists only with its act and reaches only one object

The Ashʿarī doctrine of power removes the alternative by definition. Al-Ashʿarī:

al-Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʿ, ed. Ghurāba, pp. 94–95OpenITI

فقد وجب أن من شرط قدرة الانسان أن فى وجودها وجود مقدورها؛ فاذا كان ذلك استحال أن يقدر الانسان على الشيء وضده؛ لأنه لو قدر عليهما لوجب وجودهما، وذلك محال.

“So it is necessary that a condition of man’s power is that its existence is the existence of its object; and if that is so, it is impossible that man has power over a thing and its contrary, for if he had power over both, both would have to exist, and that is impossible.”

al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd al-awāʾil, ed. ʿImād al-Dīn Ḥaydar (Muʾassasat al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyya), pp. 325–326OpenITI

منها أن القدرة على الكسب عرض لا يصح أن يبقى … لأن الدليل قد قام على أن القدرة الواحدة المحدثة لا يصح أن يقدر القادر بها على مقدورين لا مثلين ولا مختلفين غيرين ولا ضدين ولا خلافين ليسا بضدين.

“Among them: the power to acquire is an accident that cannot endure … for the proof has shown that by one originated power the capable one cannot have power over two objects: not two alike, nor two different, nor two contraries, nor two dissimilars that are not contraries.”

Al-Ashʿarī reports the same doctrine from al-Najjār: “the one capacity does not do two acts … in its existence is the existence of the act, and in its absence the absence of the act” (Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn, ed. Naʿīm Zarzūr, vol. 1, p. 221). Binding point: if at the moment of acting the servant has power only over the act that occurs, he has no power over its contrary at that moment; and whether he has power over anything at the next moment depends entirely on God creating it then. A power that exists only with its single object is the definition of “choice” in Chapter One denied by the Ashʿarīs’ own words.

(c) There is no effect but God’s

Al-Rāzī argues that possibility needs a determinate cause, so every possible thing goes back to one being, and concludes: “it is established that there is no cause [of effect] but the One, the Unique, the Real” (vol. 9, p. 77). Earlier in the same volume he puts the servant’s case plainly: “when God makes that whole [the power with the motive], the act is necessary, and when He does not, the act is impossible; so the servant is not independent in bringing anything into being” (vol. 9, p. 34). Al-Ghazālī states the doctrine for all created things:

al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād (Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya), p. 60OpenITI

وقد عرفت من جملة هذا أن الحادثات كلها، جواهرها وأعراضها الحادثة منها في ذات الأحياء والجمادات، واقعة بقدرة الله تعالى، وهو المستبد باختراعها، وليس تقع بعض المخلوقات ببعض بل الكل يقع بالقدرة.

“You have learned from all this that all originated things, their substances and their accidents, those that occur in living beings and in inanimate things, occur by the power of God, the Exalted, who alone invents them; and no created thing occurs by another, but all occurs by the [divine] power.”

Binding point: if no created thing produces an effect, the servant’s will produces none either. It is a place in which God creates the act, as fire is a place in which God creates burning.

(d) The servant’s power would make God powerless

Whatever the servant can do, God can do. Al-Rāzī: if what is within God’s power came about by the servant’s power, then once it existed God could no longer bring it about, “so it would have to be said that the servant prevented God from the act and made Him powerless over it, after [God] had been able to do it; and it is known that this is impossible” (vol. 9, p. 83). Al-Bāqillānī argues that God has power over the like of the servant’s acquisition, “for if He did not have power over it while having power over its like, He would be powerless over it” (Tamhīd, p. 342). Al-Ghazālī says the contrary view “entails impotence and mutual hindrance” (al-Iqtiṣād, p. 60). Binding point: every school affirms that God has power over everything. A servant whose act escapes that power is a limit on it; a servant whose act falls within it acts only as God’s power brings about.

8. Two further witnesses: al-Sanūsī and Ibn Ḥazm

Al-Sanūsī’s Umm al-barāhīn is the creed taught to beginners in Ashʿarī schools from North Africa to Southeast Asia to this day. It denies every created cause, and closes the way out that the servant’s power is a force God placed in him:

al-Sanūsī, Umm al-barāhīn, OpenITI text (MatnSanusiyya, JK001240), p. 14OpenITI

ويؤخذ منه أيضا أن لا تأثير لشئ من الكائنات فى أثر ما وإلا لزم أن يستغنى ذلك الأثر عن مولانا جل وعز … وأما إن قدرته مؤثرا بقوة جعلها الله تعالى فيه كما يزعمه كثير من الجهلة فذلك محال أيضا.

“It also follows from it that no created thing has any effect on any effect whatever; otherwise that effect would be independent of our Lord, Mighty and Majestic … And if you suppose it to have effect by a power God placed in it, as many ignorant people claim, that too is impossible.”

In his commentary on his own Muqaddimāt, al-Sanūsī gives the formula of the school in four words:

al-Sanūsī, Sharḥ al-Muqaddimāt, p. 89 of the OpenITI OCR textOpenITI

والحاصل أن العبد الصحيح القوي القادر عند أهل الحق مجبور في قالب مختار؛ فمجبور من حيث أنه لا أثر له البتة في أثر ما عموما، وإنما هو وعاء وظرف للحوادث والأعراض، يخلق المولى تبارك وتعالى فيه ما شاء منها وكيف شاء.

“In sum, the healthy, strong, capable servant is, according to the people of truth, compelled in the mould of one who chooses: compelled in that he has no effect at all on anything whatever; he is only a vessel and container for events and accidents, in which the Lord, Blessed and Exalted, creates of them what He wills and as He wills.”

NoteThis passage is taken from a machine-read (OCR) copy of a printed edition. The words were checked against the scan text and obvious reading errors corrected; the printed edition and its page number could not be identified.

“Compelled in the mould of one who chooses” is the thesis of this paper in the words of a teacher of the Ashʿarī creed. The choice is the mould; the compulsion is what fills it.

Ibn Ḥazm was an enemy of the Jabriyya. Yet refuting Muʿammar and al-Jāḥiẓ, who left man no act but his will, he concedes the point on which compulsion rests: the will itself is beyond man’s power.

Ibn Ḥazm, al-Faṣl fī l-milal wa-l-ahwāʾ wa-l-niḥal (Maktabat al-Khānjī), vol. 3, p. 32OpenITI

وإذا لم يبق على قول هذين الرجلين للإنسان فعل إلا الإرادة فقد وجدنا الإرادة لا يقدر الإنسان على صرفها ولا إحالتها ولا على تبديلها بوجه من الوجوه وإنما يظهر من المرء تبديل حركاته وسكونه وأما إرادته فلا حيلة له فيها.

“If, on the view of these two men, man is left no act but the will, we have found that man cannot turn his will aside, nor change it, nor replace it in any way at all. What appears from a man is the change of his movements and his rest; as for his will, he has no means over it.”

Ibn Ḥazm uses this to show that their view is worse than Jahm’s. But the premise is his own, and it is the premise of this paper: whoever has no means over his will is compelled in his will, and the act follows the will.

9. Summary of the rational proofs and what binds whom

The table gathers the rational proofs of this Part. Each premise is one the school named in the last column already holds, which is what makes the proof binding on it.

ProofPremisesConclusionBinding on
Foreknowledge (Ch. 1)God’s knowledge is eternal, complete and infallible; what entails the impossible is impossible; no creature has power over God’s eternal knowledgeThe unknown side is impossible, the known side necessaryAll schools, the Muʿtazila included
Abū Lahab (Ch. 1)A report revealed in time cannot be false; no one has power over a past eventAbū Lahab’s belief was impossible while he was commanded to believeAll schools; closes the “knowledge outside time” escape
Creation of the will (Ch. 1)The will is originated and needs a preponderator; God creates the motiveBefore the motive the act is impossible, after it necessaryAshʿarīs, Māturīdīs, Atharīs
Preponderance (Ch. 1)A possible does not prevail without a preponderator; no infinite regressWith the preponderator the act is necessary, without it impossibleEveryone who proves a maker of the world
Ignorance of the details (Ch. 4)Precise, specified acts come only from one who knows them; the servant does not know his acts’ detailsThe servant is not the originator of his actsEveryone who proves God’s knowledge from the precision of creation
Mutual hindrance (Ch. 4)Two independent powers over one act cannot both decideEither the servant is a second creator or God’s will decidesEveryone who proves God’s oneness by mutual hindrance
Chain of the soul (Ch. 4)Each stage of the act follows the one before by necessity; the first conception is not chosenMan is compelled in his very choosingThe Muʿtazila (doctrine of the motive) and the Ashʿarīs
Beliefs not chosen (Ch. 4)Beliefs rest on self-evident truths; conclusions follow necessarilyFaith and unbelief are compelledAll schools
Statements about the future (Ch. 4)One of two contradictories is true; the past cannot be changedThe act is fixed before the servant existsEveryone who uses the law of the excluded middle
Good and evil (Ch. 4)Reason does not know good and evil; the servant is compelledDenying compulsion loses the Ashʿarī ethicsAshʿarīs

Part Three: Refining Four Subtle Questions Raised by Later Theologians, and the Proof “Sharpening the Sight”

In this part we take up four claims often invoked by those who wish to reconcile the preceding texts with freedom of choice. In each we follow the same method: the claim is set out in its own box, in its proponents’ strongest form, with the fallacy it commits; then we show that careful verification does not remove it from being a confirmation of determinism rather than a denial of it. We then add two purely rational chapters: “Sharpening the Sight” and a chapter of philosophical proofs.

Chapter One: “God’s Knowledge Is Disclosive, Not Efficacious,” and “Knowledge Follows the Known”

First point. That knowledge is “disclosive, not efficacious” is sound in itself as to mechanism, but it addresses a problem other than the one this study raises. The question is not: does God’s knowledge cause the event? It is: can the known event occur contrary to what God knew? The answer on which all the sects agree (the Muʿtazila included) is no, because error and failure to match reality cannot befall God’s knowledge. The proof from foreknowledge (Part Two, Chapter One) needs nothing more than this impossibility: it makes the contrary of the known impossible by another at the moment of choosing, whether or not we call the knowledge a cause. The sun analogy fails at exactly this point: our knowledge of tomorrow’s sunrise is fallible, so tomorrow’s eclipse of our expectation remains possible; God’s knowledge is not.

Second point. The claim of “mere disclosure” ignores that God’s knowledge is not isolated from His power, creation, will and writing. God’s knowledge of the servant’s act is not like our knowledge of something outside our will; it is the knowledge of a Creator who knows what He Himself will create, since He is the creator of the servants’ acts (Q 37:96). And as the hadith of the Pen shows (“Write the decree … what is to be”) the knowledge was turned into writing, which is an act, not a passive disclosure.

Al-Rāzī answered this reply in the same place, and his answer is final:

al-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ghayb (Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth), on Q 2:6, vol. 2, pp. 289–290Shamela

وَأَمَّا قَوْلُ الْكَعْبِيِّ فَفِي نِهَايَةِ الضَّعْفِ، لِأَنَّا وَإِنْ كُنَّا لَا نَدْرِي أَنَّ اللَّهَ تَعَالَى كَانَ فِي الْأَزَلِ عَالِمًا بِوُجُودِ الْإِيمَانِ أَوْ بِعَدَمِهِ لَكُنَّا نَعْلَمُ أَنَّ الْعِلْمَ بِأَحَدِ هَذَيْنِ الْأَمْرَيْنِ كَانَ حَاصِلًا، وَهُوَ الْآنَ أَيْضًا حَاضِرٌ، فَلَوْ حَصَلَ مَعَ الْعِلْمِ بِأَحَدِ النَّقِيضَيْنِ ذَلِكَ النَّقِيضُ الْآخَرُ لَزِمَ اجْتِمَاعُ النَّقِيضَيْنِ، وَلَوْ قِيلَ بِأَنَّ ذَلِكَ الْعِلْمَ لَا يَبْقَى كَانَ ذَلِكَ اعْتِرَافًا بِانْقِلَابِ الْعِلْمِ جَهْلًا.

“As for al-Kaʿbī’s statement, it is extremely weak. For even if we do not know whether God in eternity knew the existence of faith or its non-existence, we know that the knowledge of one of these two was present, and it is present now as well; so if the other contradictory occurred together with the knowledge of one of the two, the conjunction of contradictories would follow; and if it were said that that knowledge does not remain, that would be an admission that knowledge turns into ignorance.”

Third point. Al-Kaʿbī is careful not to say that God’s knowledge would change: he supposes “one knowledge in place of another.” But only one knowledge actually exists, eternal and fixed, and the servant has no power to bring about a different eternity in its place. With respect to the knowledge that actually exists, its object (the servant’s act) is one, fixed from eternity, admitting no other. That is determinism itself, whether we express it in the language of knowledge, of writing or of creation.

Summary of this chapter. The distinction between disclosive and efficacious knowledge is sound in its own domain, but it does not touch determinism, because determinism does not rest on knowledge being a cause. It rests on the impossibility of the known failing to occur, and that impossibility is affirmed by all. The outcome is one: what occurred was not such that another outcome could occur.

Chapter Two: “God’s Knowledge Is of Universals, Not Particulars,” and the Philosophers’ Doctrine

Statement of the claim and its source

This claim is not among the sayings of the Sunnīs at all; it is the doctrine of the Peripatetic philosophers influenced by Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā: God knows things only “in a universal manner” and does not know changing, determinate particulars, because knowledge of changing particulars, in their view, entails change in the essence of the knower. Al-Ghazālī, in Tahāfut al-falāsifa, counted the denial of God’s knowledge of particulars as one of three questions on account of which he declared the philosophers unbelievers outright, alongside the eternity of the world and the denial of bodily resurrection.

al-Anʿām 6:59

﴿وَعِندَهُ مَفَاتِحُ الْغَيْبِ لَا يَعْلَمُهَا إِلَّا هُوَ ۚ وَيَعْلَمُ مَا فِي الْبَرِّ وَالْبَحْرِ ۚ وَمَا تَسْقُطُ مِن وَرَقَةٍ إِلَّا يَعْلَمُهَا وَلَا حَبَّةٍ فِي ظُلُمَاتِ الْأَرْضِ وَلَا رَطْبٍ وَلَا يَابِسٍ إِلَّا فِي كِتَابٍ مُّبِينٍ﴾

“And with Him are the keys of the unseen; none knows them except Him. And He knows what is on the land and in the sea. Not a leaf falls but that He knows it, and no grain within the darknesses of the earth and no moist or dry thing but that it is in a clear register.”

Āl ʿImrān 3:5

﴿إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَخْفَىٰ عَلَيْهِ شَيْءٌ فِي الْأَرْضِ وَلَا فِي السَّمَاءِ﴾

“Indeed, nothing is hidden from Allah on the earth or in the heaven.”

Yūnus 10:61

﴿وَمَا يَعْزُبُ عَن رَّبِّكَ مِن مِّثْقَالِ ذَرَّةٍ فِي الْأَرْضِ وَلَا فِي السَّمَاءِ وَلَا أَصْغَرَ مِن ذَٰلِكَ وَلَا أَكْبَرَ إِلَّا فِي كِتَابٍ مُّبِينٍ﴾

“And not absent from your Lord is any atom’s weight within the earth or within the heaven or [anything] smaller than that or greater, except that it is in a clear register.”

The bearing of this question on our subject

First point. This doctrine is outright unbelief by the consensus of the Sunnīs, as al-Ghazālī decided, so it cannot be used at all in a creedal discussion within Islam; it entails ignorance in God, which is impossible by reason and by the text of dozens of explicit verses.

Second point (the graver). Affirming God’s knowledge of particulars (which is the truth from which there is no escape) demolishes any hope of escape from determinism: it means that every determinate act that will issue from every individual, at every moment of his life, is known to God from eternity in all its details and written in the Preserved Tablet. And this is the only escape left from the proof from foreknowledge: as al-Rāzī reports, Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam denied that God knows things before they occur precisely “in flight from those difficulties.” Whoever narrows God’s knowledge to escape determinism falls into unbelief; whoever affirms its fullness affirms that every particular act is fixed beforehand.

Summary of this chapter. Whoever sought an exit from determinism by narrowing God’s knowledge fell into outright unbelief by the agreement of the Sunnīs; and whoever committed to the truth (the comprehensiveness of God’s knowledge of every particular of the servants’ acts) affirmed, willy-nilly, that everything that will issue from him is known beforehand and fixed, which is determinism itself.

Chapter Three: “The Cosmic Will Is Other than the Legislative Will,” and the Will as an Eternal, Uncreated Attribute

Statement of the claim

Among the most important things the later Sunnīs established, foremost Ibn Taymiyya, is the distinction between two kinds of God’s will: the “cosmic, decretal will,” His effective volition without which nothing occurs, under which fall obedience and disobedience, faith and unbelief alike; and the “religious, legislative will,” which is what God loves, is pleased with and commands, and whose occurrence is not necessary. Ibn Taymiyya says:

Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-fatāwā, vol. 11, p. 266Shamela

فَـ "الْإِرَادَةُ الْكَوْنِيَّةُ" هِيَ مَشِيئَتُهُ لِمَا خَلَقَهُ وَجَمِيعُ الْمَخْلُوقَاتِ دَاخِلَةٌ فِي مَشِيئَتِهِ وَإِرَادَتِهِ الْكَوْنِيَّةِ وَالْإِرَادَةُ الدِّينِيَّةُ هِيَ الْمُتَضَمِّنَةُ لِمَحَبَّتِهِ وَرِضَاهُ الْمُتَنَاوِلَةُ لِمَا أَمَرَ بِهِ وَجَعَلَهُ شَرْعًا وَدِينًا. وَهَذِهِ مُخْتَصَّةٌ بِالْإِيمَانِ وَالْعَمَلِ الصَّالِحِ قَالَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى: {فَمَنْ يُرِدِ اللَّهُ أَنْ يَهدِيَهُ يَشْرَحْ صَدْرَهُ لِلْإِسْلَامِ وَمَنْ يُرِدْ أَنْ يُضِلَّهُ يَجْعَلْ صَدْرَهُ ضَيِّقًا حَرَجًا كَأَنَّمَا يَصَّعَّدُ فِي السَّمَاءِ}

“The ‘cosmic will’ is His volition for what He creates, and all created things fall within His volition and His cosmic will; and the religious will is that which includes His love and pleasure, and covers what He commanded and made law and religion, and this is specific to faith and righteous deeds. Allah, the Exalted, said: ‘Whomever Allah wants to guide, He expands his breast to Islam; and whomever He wants to leave astray, He makes his breast tight and constricted, as though he were climbing into the sky.’ ”

The critique: the distinction is true, but it serves our question

First point. Our question is “does anything occur in the universe that God did not will cosmically?”, not “is everything that occurs beloved to God?” The cosmic will, by Ibn Taymiyya’s own words, is that within which “all created things fall,” and among his examples, given before he turns to the religious will, is the very verse in which God’s will precedes guidance and misguidance (Q 6:125). The distinction therefore establishes determinism in more exact wording: the unbeliever’s unbelief and the believer’s faith both fall under an effective cosmic will that does not fail, and differ only in that unbelief is not beloved to God religiously.

Second point. That the will is an eternal uncreated attribute is a statement about the divine will itself, not about its objects, the servants’ originated acts. The eternity of the attribute does not mean that its object is undecided; on the contrary, it means that what things will come to was willed in this eternal will before the creation of time itself, which adds to the necessity rather than removing it.

Summary of this chapter. Both sound distinctions (the cosmic from the legislative, and the eternal attribute from its originated objects) do not touch the root of determinism; they secure it from a more precise angle, since they establish that what occurs of the servants’ acts occurs by an eternal, effective, cosmic will that does not fail, and deny of God only love of some of these acts, not their enforcement and inevitability.

Chapter Four: “Sharpening the Sight in Establishing the Path of Determinism”, the Exhaustive-Division Proof

This chapter sets out the rational proof in its most rigorous form: an exhaustive division proceeding from the reality of will itself, reviewing everything that could be said about the act of one who chooses and showing that every division is either false in itself or returns to determinism. The proof is given first in its own words; we then define its terms and premises, detail its divisions, set out the objections raised against it (each in its own box with the fallacy it commits) and answer them, present witnesses from the words of the imams, and apply it to the sects. Where Chapter One of Part Two began from foreknowledge, this chapter begins from the will and reaches the same point: the act occurs only when it has become necessary, by a preponderator from outside the agent.

The text of the proof

First: Defining the terms and premises

  • Will: a faculty of preferring between two opposed possibles (act and omission); that by which the agent brings one of the two sides out of equality into preponderance; it is not mere desire or inclination.
  • The possible: that whose essence requires neither existence nor non-existence; every originated thing (the servant’s act included) is possible in itself.
  • The necessary-in-itself: that whose essence requires existence; it is God alone.
  • The necessary-through-another: the possible whose existence has become necessary by the assembling of its complete cause; possible in itself, necessary through another.
  • The preponderator: that by which the possible is brought out of equality into preponderance, so that one of its two sides exists and not the other.
  • Regress: an ordering of matters each of which depends on what precedes it, without end.

The proof rests on six premises, all of which the opponents concede elsewhere in their own works:

  1. The voluntary act is originated, so it is possible in itself, not necessary in itself.
  1. The possible does not have one of its sides exist rather than the other except through a preponderator, the very rule by which they prove the world’s need of an originator and specifier.
  1. Regress in causes and preponderators is impossible; the theologians and philosophers have established this by the proofs of superimposition (al-taṭbīq) and correlativity (al-taḍāyuf).
  1. The necessary-through-another was possible in itself before its necessity, so the question about the preponderator is not cut off by it.
  1. The rational division is exhaustive: the necessary, the impossible and the possible, with nothing further (what requires existence and non-existence together is a conjunction of contradictories and returns to the impossible).
  1. What issued from a cause outside the agent in the very origin of its arising did not issue from him independently.

Second: The tree of division

DivisionRulingReason
The act is necessary in itselfFalseThe act is originated; the necessary in itself is God alone
The act is impossibleFalseIt has actually occurred
The act is necessary through anotherReturns to the possibleThe necessary through another was possible in itself before its necessity, so the first division returns
The act is possible and preferred without a preponderatorFalsePreference without a preponderator, which the opponents themselves flee
The act is possible and its preponderator is the agent himselfFalseThe agent’s preferring is another act needing a preponderator, so it regresses and the effect is never realised
The act is possible and its preponderator is other than the agentDeterminismThe act occurred from a circumstance outside the agent that makes it necessary upon him

Third: Explanation of the divisions

Why can the preponderator not be the agent himself?

What first comes to mind is to say: the agent himself is the preponderator; he prefers holding over leaving. The answer is that “preferring” is itself an event that occurs in the agent after it had not been; it is an act of the servant, and the act (by the first premise) is possible in itself, so it too needs a preponderator. If its preponderator is another preferring by the servant, the question moves to that, then to a third, and so on; each preference depends on a preference before it, without end. This is the meaning of the proof’s words, “the human’s preferring his act leads to the act’s becoming something done-to-him”: what we think of as an act issuing from the agent in the first instance turns out to be done (an effect) by a prior preferring, which in turn is done by one before it; it entails “an infinite regress of acts,” so that “in the end” the effect is not realised, for no effect occurs whose existence depends on an infinite series of conditions that must be realised one after another before it.

Why does an external preponderator end in determinism?

If the preponderator is other than the agent (a motive God creates in his heart, or a knowledge, inclination, nature or circumstance that converged on him) then the act occurred only by what is not of his independent choice, which is the meaning of the proof’s words, “the effect occurred not from the human but from a circumstance outside him that compels him by force to do the act.” That is compulsion (qasr), and determinism is nothing but compulsion. It is not the weaker compulsion of pushing a man toward what he dislikes while he wills the opposite. It is compulsion at the level of the will itself: the will on which the act is built is put in him from outside, so that he is forced to will what he wills. Ṣabrī said of the determinism of the schools that it “exceeds coercion in strength”; this is why. It is exactly what is expressed by “And you do not will except that Allah wills.”

The answer is in the proof: the necessary-through-another was, before it became necessary, possible in itself, at an earlier rank equal in its two sides; so what moved it from equality to necessity? Here the first division returns in full. If it is said: it became necessary without a necessitator, that is preference without a preponderator. If it is said: by a necessitator that is the self itself, then the self (possible in existence and originated) is not a complete cause in itself, being dependent in its causality on conditions and states (knowledge, motive, power, absence of obstacle), all of which are originated and possible and need a preponderator, so the question returns about them. And if it is said: by a necessitator other than the self, that is determinism. The phrase “an otherness returning to the self” changes nothing in the division; it hides the question behind a phrase.

This misunderstands the meaning of rational judgment. The three rational rulings (necessity, impossibility, possibility) are not attributes of substances in particular but divisions of everything conceivable, derived from one question: what does the reality of this thing require, considered in itself? Either it requires existence, and it is the necessary; or non-existence, and it is the impossible; or both, and it is a conjunction of contradictories (which returns to the impossible); or neither, and it is the possible. There is no fifth, because a reality either has a requirement or not, and in the first case it relates to existence, to non-existence, or to both. Whoever claims the act is “considered” has claimed that the act has a reality that requires nothing (which is exactly the possible) or requires something, so that the other divisions apply. And the act that occurs in the external world, for which one is charged, reckoned, rewarded and punished, is not a mere mental relation; were it so, accountability would fall altogether. This is exactly what was held against the Māturīdī “optional part” when it was described as a purely relational matter.

Fourth: Other objections and their answers

Is the existence of this will in the servant necessary or possible? It cannot be necessary, since the servant is possible in existence and his will is originated by consensus (the Ashʿarīs themselves hold that accidents are created by God at every instant) so it is possible and needs a preponderator, and the division returns. The difference between God’s will and the servant’s will is fundamental: God’s will is an eternal attribute, necessary in itself, which needs no preponderator, so the regress stops with it; the servant’s will is originated and possible, so nothing stops with it. To those who say, “your proof denies God’s choice,” the answer is that it does, and we accept it (Part Two, Chapter One): God’s acts issue from His eternal will and knowledge, necessary in themselves, so they too are necessary. The difference is only that the regress stops at God and does not stop at the servant, because nothing in the servant is necessary in itself.

The answer is in three respects. First, this is an admission of preference without a preponderator, which the opponents themselves flee when they argue for the world’s need of a specifier. Second, even if conceded, it proves that the act occurred by chance, not by choice; and what occurs by chance is no more ascribed to the agent than what he was compelled to, so it removes the very foundation of the responsibility they want. Third, those who give the example its strongest form apply it to God’s eternal will, necessary in itself; applied to an originated, possible will, it falls back under the first two answers.

If all conditions are assembled (power, motive, absence of any deterrent) and the act occurs in one case but not in another although the conditions match exactly, by what was the occurring case distinguished? If “by nothing,” it is preference without a preponderator; if “by something,” that thing is the completion of the cause, and at it the act becomes necessary. This is exactly the principle “the possible, so long as it has not become necessary, does not exist,” and al-Rāzī’s statement that when the preponderator of existence is present the effect is necessary (Part Two, Chapter One).

This concedes the necessity we claim and moves the dispute to the meaning of the word “choice.” We established in “Accountability Together with Determinism” that the validity of accountability does not depend on the possibility of the opposite act but on the act’s issuing from the agent’s will. The disagreement remains: whence did this will come? The proof answered: it cannot be from the agent himself except by regress, so it is from other than him. And by the definition with which Part Two began (choice is the power to preponderate between possibles) an act that is necessary before the agent “chooses” it is not chosen in that sense at all.

Inner experience bears witness to the existence of will and the absence of external compulsion; it does not bear witness that the human being is the first source of his will, and it does not inform us of the causes of the motive we feel. This is exactly what the Qurʾān reported when it affirmed will and ascribed its origin to God: “And you do not will except that Allah wills”, acknowledging the will we find and denying that it is independent.

Fifth: Witnesses from the words of the imams

This proof is in origin woven by the theologians and philosophers themselves, not from outside them. Its two decisive steps are stated in al-Rāzī’s own words, quoted in Part Two, Chapter One: that the servant cannot be the preponderator of his preference “otherwise an infinite regress follows,” and that “before that preponderator is present the issuing of the act is impossible, and after it is present it is necessary,” from which he concluded that “determinism follows necessarily” (Mafātīḥ al-ghayb, 2/291–292). The principle that the possible does not exist until it has become necessary is the standard formulation of Ibn Sīnā (al-Ishārāt, fourth namaṭ; al-Shifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt), and it passed into later kalām as a given. Al-Rāzī states the premise of the motive argument in his al-Maḥṣūl as well, in answer to the objection that power must precede the act:

al-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, vol. 2, pp. 273–274 (on whether the command attaches to the agent at the time of the act)Shamela

والجواب: القدرة مع الداعي مؤثرة في وجود الفعل ومستلزمة له، ولا امتناع في كون المؤثر مقارنا للأثر كما في سائر المؤثرات الموجبة.

“The answer: power together with the motive is effective in the existence of the act and necessitates it; and there is nothing impossible in the effective cause accompanying its effect, as with all other necessitating causes.”

And in the same book, discussing the command of what cannot be done, he meets the charge “determinism follows” from foreknowledge not by denying it but by asking why it should be impossible:

al-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, vol. 2, p. 222 (on the command of what cannot be done)Shamela

قوله: يلزم الجبر، قلنا: إن عنيت بالجبر أن العبد لا يتمكن من شيء على خلاف علم الله تعالى فلم قلت إنه محال؟

“His saying: ‘Determinism follows.’ We say: if by determinism you mean that the servant cannot do anything contrary to God’s knowledge, then why did you say that this is impossible?”

Ibn Taymiyya, answering the Imāmī al-Ḥillī, reports that the leading Muʿtazila and Shīʿa who followed Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī held the act necessary once motive and power are present, and then makes that very principle the doctrine of the verifiers of the Sunnīs:

Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya, the tenth reply (al-wajh al-ʿāshir) in the section on the decreeWikisource

هذا السؤال وارد على هذا المصنف وعلى غيره من محققي المعتزلة والرافضة الذين اتبعوا أبا الحسين البصري حيث قال إنه مع وجود الداعي والقدرة يجب وجود المقدور وذلك أن الله خلق الداعي في العبد وقول أبي الحسين ومتبعيه في القدر وهو قول محققي أهل السنة الذين يقولون إن الله خلق قدرة العبد وإرادته وذلك مستلزم لخلقه فعل العبد

“This question falls on this author and on others among the verifiers of the Muʿtazila and the Rāfiḍa who followed Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, since he said that with the presence of the motive and the power, the existence of the empowered act is necessary, and that is because God created the motive in the servant. And the view of Abū l-Ḥusayn and his followers on the decree is the view of the verifiers of the people of the Sunna, who say that God created the servant’s power and will, and that entails His creating the servant’s act.”

Ibn Taymiyya goes on to insist that the servant is still “the real doer of his act.” But he has granted both premises (the act is necessary given motive and power, and God creates both) and the proof of this chapter needs nothing more.

Editorial noteOn attributing the view to al-Rāzī: al-Rāzī set out the argument from the motive as binding on the Muʿtazila and on everyone who holds the servant’s independence, and showed that it ends in determinism; but researchers differ about his own final doctrine, and he combined in his books this argument with the affirmation of accountability. We cite him as a witness for the soundness of the premises and the entailment, not for his adopting the title “determinism.”

Al-Ghazālī: “compelled to choose”

Al-Ghazālī, whom the Sunnīs call “the proof of Islam,” reaches the same conclusion in Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn, in the book of divine unity and trust, and states it in the plainest terms:

al-Ghazālī, Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn, Book of Divine Unity and Trust (Kitāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul), first partIḥyāʾ text

فإن قلت فهذا جبر محض، والجبر يناقض الاختيار، وأنت لا تنكر الاختيار، فكيف يكون مجبورا مختارا؟ فأقول: لو انكشف الغطاء لعرفت أنه في عين الاختيار مجبور، فهو إذن مجبور على الاختيار.

“If you say: this is pure compulsion, and compulsion contradicts choice, and you do not deny choice, so how can he be compelled and choosing? I say: if the veil were lifted, you would know that in the very act of choosing he is compelled; so he is compelled to choose.”

He then explains how. The will follows the judgment of the mind that an act is good; the judgment arises in the person, not from him; the power follows the will, and the movement follows the power. His example: a man cannot cut his own throat although his hand is sound and the knife is in it, because the will to do it does not arise in him:

al-Ghazālī, Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn, Book of Divine Unity and Trust, first partIḥyāʾ text

ولذلك لو أراد الإنسان أن يحز رقبة نفسه مثلا لم يمكنه، لا لعدم القدرة في اليد، ولا لعدم السكين، ولكن لفقد الإرادة الداعية المشخصة للقدرة … لأن داعية الإرادة مسخرة بحكم العقل والحس، والقدرة مسخرة للداعية، والحركة مسخرة للقدرة، والكل مقدر بالضرورة فيه من حيث لا يدري، فإنما هو محل ومجرى لهذه الأمور، فأما أن يكون منه فكلا ولا. فإذن معنى كونه مجبورا أن جميع ذلك حاصل فيه من غيره لا منه، ومعنى كونه مختارا أنه محل لإرادة حدثت فيه جبرا بعد حكم العقل بكون الفعل خيرا محضا موافقا، وحدث الحكم أيضا جبرا، فإذا هو مجبور على الاختيار … وفعل الإنسان على منزلة بين المنزلتين، فإنه جبر على الاختيار، فطلب أهل الحق لهذا عبارة ثالثة … فسموه كسبا.

“That is why, if a man wanted to cut his own throat, for example, he could not: not for lack of power in his hand, nor for lack of a knife, but for lack of the motivating will that sets the power to work … For the motive of the will is subjected to the judgment of the mind and the senses, the power is subjected to the motive, and the movement is subjected to the power, and all of it is decreed in him by necessity, without his knowing; he is only a locus and a channel for these things; that any of it should be from him, no, never. So the meaning of his being compelled is that all of this comes about in him from another, not from himself; and the meaning of his being a chooser is that he is the locus of a will that arose in him by compulsion, after the mind judged the act to be purely good and suitable, and the judgment too arose by compulsion; so he is compelled to choose … The act of man is at a station between the two stations, for it is compulsion to choose; so the people of truth sought a third expression for it … and called it acquisition (kasb).”

This is the proof of this chapter in al-Ghazālī’s words. Choice is a will; the will has a preponderator, the judgment of the mind; the judgment arises in the person by compulsion; so the act that follows is necessary once its causes are present, and impossible without them. And al-Ghazālī adds what Part Two argued about acquisition. He calls man’s act “a station between the two stations,” but the station he describes is “compulsion to choose,” and kasb is the name the Ashʿarīs gave to it.

Sixth: Applying the proof to the sects

SectIts predicament in light of the proof
The Muʿtazila (the servant’s independence in originating his act)If they make the will the preponderator, they fall into regress or preference without a preponderator; if they make the external motive the preponderator, they fall into determinism. And the proof from foreknowledge binds them whatever they say of the will.
The Ashʿariyya (acquisition)With al-Ashʿarī, a power without effect: the “moderate determinism” of al-Shahrastānī’s definition, which al-Juwaynī judged “like denying power altogether.” With the later Ashʿarīs, an effect that is itself originated and needs a preponderator: the division applies.
The Māturīdiyya (the optional part)If its preponderator is from the servant, it regresses; if from other than him, it is determinism; if it is a relational consideration, it cannot have any effect.
The moderate Hadith people (power and motive are created, and the servant is a real agent)They concede the necessity of the act when motive and power are complete, and God’s creation of both; so on verification they end in determinism, even if they call it real agency.

Summary of this chapter. The exhaustive division shows that the voluntary act falls under one of six divisions, five of which are false in themselves or return to the sixth, and the sixth is determinism: the act occurred by a preponderator outside the agent’s independence, and the origin of this preponderator in the end is God’s creation of the motive, the will and the power. This is compulsion at the very origin of his will, which is more complete than compulsion toward what he dislikes, and it is what the texts said: “And you do not will except that Allah wills.”

Chapter Five: Additional Philosophical Refutations, from Ibn Sīnā, al-Rāzī and Ibn Rushd

First: Ibn Sīnā’s principle, “The possible, so long as it has not become necessary, does not exist”

Ibn Sīnā (d. 428 AH) established in his discussions of existence and causes a principle that became one of the givens of later kalām: every existent other than God is in itself “possible of existence” (its existence and non-existence are equal considering its bare essence) and this possible “so long as it has not become necessary does not exist”: it does not pass from bare possibility into actual existence unless a complete cause is joined to it, making it “necessary of existence through another.” This is set out in al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt (fourth namaṭ, on existence and causes) and in the metaphysics of al-Shifāʾ and al-Najāt.

Applied to human choice: the servant’s choice is “possible” before its complete cause is assembled, and that cause includes his knowledge, his motive, his power, the absence of obstacles, and God’s eternal effective will, the source of all these. When the cause is complete (which must happen, since God decreed, knew and wrote it) the act turns from “possible” to “necessary through another,” and cannot fail to occur. Whatever name is given to what the servant adds to this cause (acquisition, optional part) once the complete cause is assembled it cannot fail to occur, “for what has become necessary cannot fail to be.” This is the definition of Part Two in the language of the philosophers: the act is carried out only when it has become necessary, and at that moment its opposite is impossible.

Second: al-Rāzī’s argument from motives

Al-Rāzī (d. 606 AH) advanced a well-known proof, known among researchers as “the argument from motives,” with which he bound those who affirm the servant’s independence to the entailments of determinism. Its text, from his commentary on Q 2:7, is quoted in Part Two, Chapter One; its steps are:

  1. The voluntary act does not issue from bare power, but from power joined to a decisive motive that prefers act over omission or omission over act; were the power’s relation to the two sides equal with no preponderator, the issuing of one of them in particular would be impossible, the rule all theologians accept elsewhere, as in proving the possible world’s need of a specifier.
  1. This motive was either produced by the servant by his choice, or not.
  1. If he produced it by his choice, that producing needs another motive, and the question regresses without end, which is impossible by the agreement of the rational.
  1. If he did not produce it, but it came to him from outside his will (by God’s creation of it in his heart) then what moves his choice and fixes its direction precedes his choice and is independent of his will.

Whether the mover of the act is called acquisition, optional part or originated power, it needs a motive that prefers it; that motive is created in the servant and does not issue from his independent choice, else the impossible regress follows. The servant is therefore not the creator of the origin of his impulse toward the act; he is acted upon by a motive he did not choose, and his act is the necessary result of it. The same argument explains why those who affirm “power over both opposites” cannot explain why one side occurs rather than the other except by returning to the motive, which the servant did not create.

Third: material from Ibn Rushd against the agent’s independence, with the necessary caution

Scholarly trust requires us to say that Ibn Rushd (d. 595 AH), in al-Kashf ʿan manāhij al-adilla, did not adopt pure determinism but criticised both the Ashʿarīs and the Muʿtazila and held a middle view closer to Peripatetic philosophy. Yet one element of his analysis is suited as material against the Muʿtazila specifically: that the human act is not completed merely by the agent’s will, but depends on causes external to him over which he has no authority (the soundness of the instrument, the presence of a receptive substrate, the absence of obstacles) and that these are ordered in an all-encompassing causal chain going back to the First Agent. The human being, on Ibn Rushd’s own account, is therefore not a complete independent cause of his act such as the Muʿtazilī “creator” would require, but a partial cause in a network he does not control. This is taken as an argument against the Muʿtazila only, without ascribing to Ibn Rushd the determinism that is our subject.

Chapter Six: Summary of Part Three

The four questions raised by the later theologians (disclosive knowledge, knowledge following the known, restricting knowledge to universals, and the distinction between the two wills together with the eternity of the will) all, on careful verification, do not take the reader out of determinism but bring him into it through more precise doors than the explicit texts of Part One. Each of them, set in its own box, turned out to rest on a fallacy: answering a question that was not asked, assuming what was in dispute, or sliding between two senses of one word. The exhaustive division of “Sharpening the Sight” then showed that the voluntary act does not go beyond the necessary-through-another, the impossible or the possible, and that every division is either false or returns to determinism; and the philosophical chapter documented its principles from Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī. Joined to the texts of Part One and the proof from foreknowledge of Part Two, the reader has before him explicit transmitted evidence and explicit reason for a single conclusion.

Further Texts

A sacred hadith: God’s prohibition of injustice upon Himself, and that all guidance is from God

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (2577), from Abū DharrSunnah.com

عن أبي ذر عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم فيما روى عن الله تبارك وتعالى أنه قال: «يا عبادي، إني حرّمت الظلم على نفسي وجعلته بينكم محرّمًا فلا تظالموا. يا عبادي، كلكم ضال إلا من هديته، فاستهدوني أهدكم…».

Abū Dharr reported from the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, from what he related from Allah, blessed and exalted, that He said: “O My servants, I have forbidden injustice for Myself and have made it forbidden among you, so do not wrong one another. O My servants, all of you are astray except one whom I have guided, so seek guidance from Me and I will guide you…”

This sacred hadith serves the subject of this study in two ways. First, “all of you are astray except one whom I have guided” states that guidance is, from the outset, purely from God, not the result of a merit or independent effort of the servant that precedes it. Second, God’s forbidding injustice upon Himself (which the Muʿtazila adduce) is precisely what makes the question of Part Two, Chapter Three unavoidable: if the prohibition is to forbid anything, “injustice” must have a content that God’s acts could, in principle, fall under; if it is defined as disposing of another’s property, the prohibition forbids nothing God could ever do.

Ibn al-Qayyim: “We made them leaders calling to the Fire”

Ibn al-Qayyim’s warning about ambiguous words is right, and it applies to his own word “enabled.” If God “decreed and ordained” that the man be a leader calling to the Fire, then the opposite (that he not be one) was known to God not to occur, and so was impossible to occur. What is left to him is the power to do the one thing decreed. That is not “enabling” in the sense of a choice between two possibles; it is compulsion. Ibn al-Qayyim rejects only compulsion against the will, as if compulsion had to come from outside the will to be compulsion. But the will itself is created and made to will the decreed side, and a man compelled in his will is more completely compelled than one forced against it: the second still has a will of his own that resists, the first has none left that is his.

Appendix: The Opponents’ Strongest Objections

The introduction promised that the strongest objections of the opponents would be set out fairly. Most have been set out in their place, each in its own box with the fallacy it commits, before the reply. The rest are set out here: the objection from the texts of command, promise and threat, and the objections from particular verses; the table that follows lists every objection treated in this study.

The same Qurʾān that says “whoever wills, let him believe” says, of the very same will, “And you do not will except that Allah wills” (Q 81:29; 76:30), the second verse in the very sūra that says “be he grateful or be he ungrateful.” The command addresses the will the servant finds in himself; the decree states where that will comes from. Nor did Mohammed draw the objectors’ conclusion: asked “should we not remain on what is written for us and leave off deeds?”, he commanded the deed and affirmed the writing in the same breath (no. 13). As for the meaninglessness of a command to one who cannot do otherwise: al-Rāzī himself argued at length that God commanded Abū Lahab to believe while reporting that he would never believe (Q 111:1–3), and he called the same argument from God’s report on Q 2:6 “the one that demolishes the foundations of the Muʿtazila” (Part Two, Chapter One). Whether such a command is just is the question of Part Two, Chapter Three; that it was issued, the texts leave no doubt.

al-Masad 111:1–3

﴿تَبَّتْ يَدَا أَبِي لَهَبٍ وَتَبَّ ۝ مَا أَغْنَىٰ عَنْهُ مَالُهُ وَمَا كَسَبَ ۝ سَيَصْلَىٰ نَارًا ذَاتَ لَهَبٍ﴾

“May the hands of Abū Lahab perish, and he has perished. His wealth will not avail him or what he gained. He will burn in a Fire of flame.”

Jahm ibn Ṣafwān, the founder of pure determinism, answered this long ago, as al-Shahrastānī reports:

al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa-l-niḥal, vol. 1, p. 87 (on the Jahmiyya)Shamela

إن الإنسان لا يقدر على شيء، ولا يوصف بالاستطاعة، وإنما هو مجبور في أفعاله، لا قدرة له، ولا إرادة، ولا اختيار، وإنما يخلق الله تعالى الأفعال فيه على حسب ما يخلق في سائر الجمادات، وتنسب إليه الأفعال مجازا كما تنسب إلى الجمادات، كما يقال: أثمرت الشجرة، وجرى الماء، وتحرك الحجر، وطلعت الشمس وغربت، وتغيمت السماء وأمطرت، واهتزت الأرض وأنبتت، إلى غير ذلك.

“Man has power over nothing and is not described as able; he is compelled in his acts, with no power, will or choice. God creates the acts in him as He creates them in all inanimate things, and the acts are ascribed to him figuratively, as they are ascribed to inanimate things, as one says: the tree bore fruit, the water flowed, the stone moved, the sun rose and set, the sky clouded over and rained, the earth stirred and brought forth plants, and so on.”

This study does not adopt Jahm’s denial that man has any will; it affirms the will and shows that it is created and necessitated. But on the point at issue Jahm is right, and al-Ghazālī says the same in Sunnī words: man “is only a locus and a channel for these things” (Part Three, Chapter Four). The Qurʾān itself joins both ascriptions in one verse: “And Allah created you and what you do” (Q 37:96). The act is “what you do,” ascribed to the servant, and in the same breath “created” by God. Ascription to the servant is ascription to the locus.

The answer is in Adam’s own words. The Adam who said “we have wronged ourselves” is the Adam who, when Moses blamed him, answered: “Do you blame me for a matter that God decreed for me forty years before He created me?” And Mohammed’s verdict on that exchange was: “So Adam prevailed over Moses” (hadith no. 3 in Part One). Adam confessed the sin as his, and argued from the decree that it was written before he existed. The confession and the decree stand together in the same person. The confession shows where the sin occurred. The decree shows where it came from.

al-Anʿām 6:148–149

﴿سَيَقُولُ الَّذِينَ أَشْرَكُوا لَوْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ مَا أَشْرَكْنَا وَلَا آبَاؤُنَا وَلَا حَرَّمْنَا مِن شَيْءٍ ۚ كَذَٰلِكَ كَذَّبَ الَّذِينَ مِن قَبْلِهِمْ حَتَّىٰ ذَاقُوا بَأْسَنَا ۗ قُلْ هَلْ عِندَكُم مِّنْ عِلْمٍ فَتُخْرِجُوهُ لَنَا ۖ إِن تَتَّبِعُونَ إِلَّا الظَّنَّ وَإِنْ أَنتُمْ إِلَّا تَخْرُصُونَ ﴿148﴾ قُلْ فَلِلَّهِ الْحُجَّةُ الْبَالِغَةُ ۖ فَلَوْ شَاءَ لَهَدَاكُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ ﴿149﴾﴾

“Those who associated others with Allah will say, ‘If Allah had willed, we would not have associated [anything], nor would our fathers, nor would we have prohibited anything.’ Likewise did those before them deny until they tasted Our punishment. Say, ‘Do you have any knowledge that you can produce for us? You follow nothing but assumption, and you are only guessing.’ Say, ‘With Allah is the conclusive argument. So had He willed, He would have guided you all.’”

God does not deny that their polytheism happened by His will. In the next verse He states it: “had He willed, He would have guided you all,” so He did not will to guide them. What He rejects is what they built on it: “nor would we have prohibited anything.” They took God’s cosmic will as proof of His approval and of the lawfulness of what they did, which is the confusion of the cosmic will with the legislative will treated in Part Three, Chapter Three. That is why the reproach is “you follow nothing but assumption”: their error was a claim to know what God approves, not the statement that nothing happens without His will.

al-Nisāʾ 4:78–79

﴿أَيْنَمَا تَكُونُوا يُدْرِككُّمُ الْمَوْتُ وَلَوْ كُنتُمْ فِي بُرُوجٍ مُّشَيَّدَةٍ ۗ وَإِن تُصِبْهُمْ حَسَنَةٌ يَقُولُوا هَٰذِهِ مِنْ عِندِ اللَّهِ ۖ وَإِن تُصِبْهُمْ سَيِّئَةٌ يَقُولُوا هَٰذِهِ مِنْ عِندِكَ ۚ قُلْ كُلٌّ مِّنْ عِندِ اللَّهِ ۖ فَمَالِ هَٰؤُلَاءِ الْقَوْمِ لَا يَكَادُونَ يَفْقَهُونَ حَدِيثًا ﴿78﴾ مَّا أَصَابَكَ مِنْ حَسَنَةٍ فَمِنَ اللَّهِ ۖ وَمَا أَصَابَكَ مِن سَيِّئَةٍ فَمِن نَّفْسِكَ ۚ وَأَرْسَلْنَاكَ لِلنَّاسِ رَسُولًا ۚ وَكَفَىٰ بِاللَّهِ شَهِيدًا ﴿79﴾﴾

“Wherever you may be, death will overtake you, even if you should be within towers of lofty construction. And if good comes to them, they say, ‘This is from Allah’; and if evil befalls them, they say, ‘This is from you.’ Say: All is from Allah. So what is the matter with those people that they can hardly understand any statement? Whatever good reaches you is from Allah, and whatever evil befalls you is from yourself. And We have sent you to the people as a messenger, and sufficient is Allah as Witness.”

The disagreement arises from the two verses together, and the Muʿtazilī reading of the second is not drawn from the verse. It depends on a premise brought from outside it: that God is above doing what is evil, so that an evil act cannot be His creation. We do not grant that premise, and the verse does not state it. Those who assert it must prove it, with premises and demonstrations of their own; until they do, the verse is no evidence for them. Without that premise, the two verses are read together without contradiction: “all is from Allah” by creation and decree, and evil is “from yourself” as the one in whom it occurs and who bears its blame, which is how Adam confessed “we have wronged ourselves” while arguing from the decree (see the box on the prophets’ confessions above). Verse 78, moreover, is spoken against those who said evil was “from you,” and its reply is not “from yourselves” but “all is from Allah.”

The verse speaks of command, and determinism is a claim about what God wills to occur. That God’s cosmic will is for an act to happen does not contradict that the compelled act is hated and blamed by God: He wills it to occur, and He does not command it and does not love it. This is the distinction drawn in Part Three, Chapter Three, and it is the same answer as to “Had God willed, we would not have associated” above: the polytheists’ error was to take what God willed to occur as what He commanded and approved.

Prayer and work under the decree

It is often said against determinism that it makes prayer, effort and work pointless. This study does not deny it; it affirms it. Work is an originated act and prayer is an act, and determinism does not deny that these acts occur. It establishes that the person is driven to them. The one who prays was made to pray, and the one who does not pray was made not to; neither prayer nor its absence is a choice between two possibles that could have gone otherwise. And the Sunnī texts themselves say this.

The Companions drew the conclusion themselves and put it to Mohammed: “Should we not rely on what is written for us and leave off deeds?” His answer did not give their acts back to them. It placed the acts inside the writing: “Act, for each is eased toward what he was created for” (al-Bukhārī 4949; the same report is hadith no. 13 in Part One). The one written for the Garden is eased toward its deeds; the one written for the Fire is eased toward its deeds. And when asked “on what basis do we act?”, he answered: “on the places where the decree falls” (hadith no. 19). The act is the place where the decree lands.

Prayer is the same:

Jāmiʿ al-Tirmidhī (2139), from Salmān; al-Tirmidhī: “ḥasan gharīb”Hadith Unlocked

لا يرد القضاء إلا الدعاء، ولا يزيد في العمر إلا البر.

“Nothing repels the decree except supplication, and nothing increases one’s lifespan except righteousness.”

The supplication that “repels the decree” is itself decreed, as everything is decreed, “even incapacity and astuteness” (hadith no. 16). Whether a person prays at all, and what he asks for, is part of what was written. So the prayer changes nothing that was not already decreed to change through it. The believer who prays is not steering the decree; he is the place where one decreed cause occurs on the way to a decreed outcome. In that sense determinism does nullify prayer and work: not their occurrence, but their being anything other than what the person was driven to.

Table of the objections and their fallacies

Each objection is listed with the fallacy it commits and a link to the place where it is set out and answered.

ArgumentFallacyWhere
This detail is an Isrāʾīlī report: Ibn ʿAbbās took it from the People of the BookSuppressed evidence (كتمان الدليل)see ↗
The other side remains possible in itself, so choice remainsEquivocation on “possible” (الاشتراك اللفظي في لفظ «الممكن»)see ↗
The necessity belongs to the conditional, not to the actSuppressed premise (إسقاط مقدمة)see ↗
If knowledge removed possibility, God Himself would have power over nothingAppeal to consequences (الاحتجاج باللوازم المكروهة)see ↗
The servant creates his voluntary act independently, by a power that can produce either sideSpecial pleading (الاستثناء الخاص)see ↗
The act is God’s creation and the servant’s acquisition (kasb); his created power accompanies the act, so he is a chooser and accountableDistinction without a difference (التفريق بلا فارق)see ↗
An uncreated “optional part” added to the created power is the ground of choiceProof by assertion (الدعوى المجردة)see ↗
The servant’s power is a real cause, so he is the real doer of his act and is not compelledDistinction without a difference (تفريق بلا فارق)see ↗
Nothing God does can be injustice, because injustice is disposing of what belongs to another, and everything belongs to GodDefinitional retreat (الفرار بإعادة التعريف)see ↗
With all these causes present, a man can still refrainEquivocation on “can refrain” (الاشتراك في لفظ «يمكنه الترك»)see ↗
The servant chooses to look at the evidence, even if the conclusion then followsBegging the question (المصادرة على المطلوب)see ↗
The Ashʿarī “compulsion” means only that the servant is not independentDistinction without a difference (تفريق بلا فارق)see ↗
God’s knowledge is disclosive, not efficaciousIrrelevant conclusion (تجاهل المطلوب)see ↗
Knowledge follows the known: had the servant done otherwise, God would have known otherwiseBegging the question (المصادرة على المطلوب)see ↗
God does not will unbelief and sin in the legislative sense, so they are the servant’s own and not from GodEquivocation on “will” (الاشتراك اللفظي في لفظ «الإرادة»)see ↗
The act is necessary through another, and that “other” is the person’s own selfBegging the question (المصادرة على المطلوب)see ↗
The act is a mere consideration (iʿtibārī), to which the rational rulings do not applySpecial pleading (الاستثناء الخاص)see ↗
The will itself is the preponderator, so the regress stops thereSpecial pleading (الاستثناء الخاص)see ↗
The capable chooser may prefer one of two like things without a preponderator (the two dates)Self-refuting special pleading (الاستثناء الخاص المناقض لأصل صاحبه)see ↗
The motive inclines but does not necessitateEquivocation on “inclines” (الاشتراك في لفظ «الترجيح»)see ↗
What is necessary by the agent’s choice does not negate choicePersuasive redefinition (التعريف المُغرِض)see ↗
Inner experience bears witness that I am freeArgument from ignorance (الاحتجاج بالجهل)see ↗
God made him a leader calling to the Fire, but by enabling him, not by compelling himFalse dilemma (الحصر الزائف)see ↗
The texts of command, promise and threat presuppose that the servant can do eitherNon sequitur (عدم اللزوم)see ↗
The Qurʾān ascribes the acts to the servants, so they are their doersEquivocation on “doing” (الاشتراك في لفظ «الفعل»)see ↗
The prophets confessed their sins as their own, so the sins were from themNon sequitur (عدم اللزوم)see ↗
God condemned the polytheists for saying “Had God willed, we would not have associated,” so appealing to the decree is falseQuoting out of context (اقتطاع النص من سياقه)see ↗
“Whatever evil befalls you is from yourself,” so evil is from the servant, not from GodBegging the question (المصادرة على المطلوب)see ↗
ArgumentFallacyWhere
“Allah does not command immorality,” so He does not will the sins that occurIrrelevant conclusion (الخروج عن محل النزاع)see ↗

Conclusion

This study has reviewed the evidence for determinism from the Qurʾān (40 passages, besides the opponents’ verses answered in the appendix), from the authentic Sunna (nineteen numbered hadiths and reports in the chapter of hadith, besides those cited in later chapters), and from the story of the boy killed by al-Khiḍr as a direct divine application of the decree; then from the proof from foreknowledge and the created will, built on the definition of choice as the power to preponderate between possibles; then from further rational proofs in the books of al-Rāzī, al-Ashʿarī, al-Bāqillānī, al-Ghazālī, al-Ījī and al-Sanūsī, among them al-Rāzī’s proof that “man is compelled in his very choosing” and al-Ījī’s premise that “the servant is compelled in his acts”; then from the definitions and admissions of the Ashʿarī, Māturīdī and Muʿtazilī authorities themselves; then from the refinement of four questions that some later authors claimed open a door of escape, and that turned out to confirm determinism; then from the exhaustive division called “Sharpening the Sight”; and finally from a philosophical chapter drawing on Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, and to a limited extent Ibn Rushd.

The sum of the matter: choice, if it means anything, means the power to preponderate between two possibles. But at the moment of choosing, the side God knew would not occur is impossible (impossible by another, as al-Ashʿarī himself put it, “impossible to occur”) and the side He knew would occur is necessary; and the will through which it occurs is created in the servant, so that before its preponderator is present the act is impossible and after it is present it is necessary, as al-Rāzī put it. The human being is therefore a creature with the appearance of choice, governed by the reality of necessity: he moves by a will he finds in himself, but it is a will created for him, known and written before his creation; he is an agent in form and acted upon in reality: driven and compelled in every act, his will included. This is the meaning of Adam’s words in his argument with Moses: “Do you blame me for a matter that Allah decreed for me forty years before He created me?”, and of Mohammed’s verdict: “So Adam prevailed over Moses.”

List of Sources and References

  1. The Noble Qurʾān (Madani imlāʾī text, quran.com).
  1. al-Bukhārī, al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaḥīḥ (numbering as on sunnah.com).
  1. Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, ed. Muḥammad Fuʾād ʿAbd al-Bāqī (Shamela 1727).
  1. Abū Dāwūd, al-Sunan, with al-Albānī’s gradings (sunnah.com).
  1. al-Tirmidhī, al-Jāmiʿ (sunnah.com).
  1. Ibn Ḥibbān, al-Ṣaḥīḥ, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnaʾūṭ.
  1. Ibn Abī ʿĀṣim, al-Sunna, with al-Albānī’s Ẓilāl al-janna.
  1. Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿaẓīm.
  1. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-ghayb (al-Tafsīr al-kabīr), Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 3rd ed. 1420 AH (Shamela 23635).
  1. al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa-l-niḥal (Shamela 11812).
  1. Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī, Ghāyat al-marām fī ʿilm al-kalām (Shamela 6364).
  1. Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-fatāwā (Shamela 7289).
  1. Ibn Abī l-ʿIzz al-Ḥanafī, Sharḥ al-ʿaqīda al-Ṭaḥāwiyya, as quoted in Ibn Jibrīn’s commentary on the Ṭaḥāwiyya (Shamela 7724).
  1. al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut al-falāsifa.
  1. Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt, fourth namaṭ; al-Shifāʾ (Ilāhiyyāt); al-Najāt.
  1. Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf ʿan manāhij al-adilla fī ʿaqāʾid al-milla.
  1. Ibn Ḥazm, al-Faṣl fī l-milal wa-l-ahwāʾ wa-l-niḥal, Maktabat al-Khānjī (OpenITI, Shamela 6521).
  1. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shifāʾ al-ʿalīl fī masāʾil al-qaḍāʾ wa-l-qadar wa-l-ḥikma wa-l-taʿlīl, Dār al-Jīl (rafed.net 3602).
  1. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Muḥaṣṣal (ar.lib.eshia.ir 71625).
  1. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl fī ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh (Shamela 2022).
  1. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya min al-ʿilm al-ilāhī, ed. Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqqā.
  1. Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, al-Musnad, with the gradings of Shuʿayb al-Arnaʾūṭ.
  1. Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya.
  1. Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, Mawqif al-ʿaql wa-l-ʿilm wa-l-ʿālam min rabb al-ʿālamīn wa-ʿibādihi al-mursalīn.
  1. Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn, Book of Divine Unity and Trust.
  1. Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid (ar.lib.eshia.ir 71426).
  1. Ibn Taymiyya, Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya (Arabic Wikisource).
  1. Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, al-Lumaʿ fī l-radd ʿalā ahl al-zaygh wa-l-bidaʿ, ed. Ḥammūda Ghurāba, al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-l-Turāth (OpenITI).
  1. Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn, ed. Naʿīm Zarzūr, al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya (OpenITI, Shamela 4137).
  1. Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd al-awāʾil wa-talkhīṣ al-dalāʾil, ed. ʿImād al-Dīn Aḥmad Ḥaydar, Muʾassasat al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyya (OpenITI, Shamela 6389).
  1. Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya (OpenITI, Shamela 9217).
  1. ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī, al-Mawāqif, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿUmayra, Dār al-Jīl, 1997 (OpenITI).
  1. Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Sanūsī, Umm al-barāhīn (OpenITI); Sharḥ al-Muqaddimāt (OpenITI OCR text).

Watch Apostate Scholar

See the series
↑↓ move ↵ open esc close Quick exit